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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is based on research of the regulatory 
framework for oil contracts in Venezuela, conducted during 
visits to Caracas in July and August 2009 and January 2010.1 
The study included reviewing Venezuelan legislation, petroleum 
contracts, and interviewing Venezuelan government officials, 
international oil companies (IOC) executives based in Venezuela 
and experts in the Venezuelan case.2 Initially, the research 
concentrated on assessing the impact of the Carabobo tender on 
the contractual conditions for oil ventures in Venezuela. This 
was for two reasons: 1) The 2009–2010 auction of the Carabobo 
Project, located in the Orinoco Belt, was highly relevant to the 
pattern of Venezuelan oil contracts to exploit the vast reserves—
estimated at 127.9  billion  barrels—of heavy crude oil,3 
and 2) the reduction of the government’s bargaining power when 
                                               
1. The research was carried out under the auspices of the Luis Castro 
Leiva Research Prize 2009, awarded by the Institute of Advanced Latin American 
Studies of the University Sorbonne-Nouvelle/Paris III, the French-Venezuelan 
Association in Social Sciences and Humanities “Jeannette Abouhamad”, and the French 
Embassy in Venezuela. See, INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES DE L’AMERIQUE LATINE 
http://www.iheal.univ-paris3.fr/spip.php?rubrique610. 
2. Respecting interviewees’ confidentiality requests, the author is not disclosing 
the identities of those interviewed. 
3. Factbox, Auction of Venezuela’s Vast Carabobo Oil Fields, REUTERS, Feb. 11, 
2010. 
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oil prices collapsed in 2008, and foreign investment in new 
projects was vital to increase oil production.4 
Based on the dates for the tender approved by the 
Venezuelan Ministry of the People’s Power for Energy and 
Petroleum (MPPEP) in early 2009, the research was conducted 
first in Caracas during a period that permitted observation of 
the auction’s outcome, scheduled for August 14, 2009.5 
Nevertheless, on July 28, 2009, the Minister of Energy and 
Petroleum and President of Petróleos de Venezuela 
S.A. (PDVSA), Rafael Ramirez, announced the halt of the 
bidding process “without providing new dates.”6 
 The delayed auction thwarted the initial attempt to assess 
the overall consequences for the contractual regime, but it 
brought new elements to light: 1) the existing contractual 
imbalances, which have limited the presentation of bids,7 2) the 
instability of the fiscal regime with the introduction and reform 
of new taxes, 3) the simultaneous implementation of both 
competitive bidding and direct negotiation to award contracts,8 
and 4) the shift in the government’s position towards approving 
economic incentives, providing greater substantive investment 
protection rights, and granting access to international 
arbitration to encourage the participation of foreign companies.9 
To improve the understanding of Venezuela’s current 
oil-sector investment framework, Part II of this Article reviews 
the major issues of the Venezuelan hydrocarbon legal regime. 
This review will demonstrate that during a period in which the 
government has increased its oil-sector control, the 
government’s overbearing position has created contractual 
imbalances, which should be assessed in light of the investor’s 
                                               
4. Sheila McNulty, Oil-Rich Nations ‘Seek Majors’ Expertise, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Mar. 10, 2009, at 24. 
5. Aplazan otra vez Licitación del Bloque Carabobo de la Faja [Carabobo Block 
Tender Delayed Again], EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), available at: 
http://www.eluniversal.com/2009/07/28/eco_art_aplazan-otra-vez-lic_1489236.shtml 
[hereinafter Aplazan otra Vez]. 
6. Id. 
7. See Benedict Mander, Chavez a Problem for Oil Groups Eyeing Vast Field, Fin. 
Times (London), Aug. 31, 2009. 
8. See Benedict Mander, Help Needed to Make Orinoco Flow, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Nov. 5, 2009, at 2 [hereinafter Help Needed to Make Orinoco Flow]. 
9. Venezuela Softens Carabobo Oil Bid Terms, REUTERS, Nov. 30, 2009. 
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rights under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT). Given the 
evolving negotiations between oil companies and the Venezuelan 
government, Part III of this Article will show how the heavy 
crude oil projects awarded after the February 2010 Carabobo 
Area tender, and the existing practice of directly assigning 
blocks in the Junín Area, also in the Orinoco belt, have led to a 
new balance in the contractual conditions which, if respected, 
might contribute in an influx of investment in the Venezuelan 
oil sector. 
II. THE REGULATORY HYDROCARBON 
REGIME IN VENEZUELA AND ITS CURRENT MAJOR ISSUES 
 
Les investisseurs doivent comprendre qu’un régime trop 
protecteur de leurs droits ne sert pas nécessairement 
leurs intérêts. Des clauses garantissant trop les seuls 
intérêts des investisseurs risquent de susciter des 
réactions brutales de la part des gouvernements futurs.10 
 
. . . l’équilibre est la règle d’or, et une nouvelle inégalité 
ne doit pas remplacer une ancienne.11 
 
The applicable legislation for oil contracts 
in Venezuela has undergone a constant and accelerated reform 
in the last decade.12 One feature of the reform was its abrupt 
rupture with the previous regime, known as the Apertura 
Petrolera [Oil Opening], implemented throughout the 1990s.13 
The Apertura allowed foreign direct investment under 
attractive financial terms and provided a contractual protection 
                                               
10. Walid BEN HAMIDA, LA PRISE EN COMPTE DE L’INTERET GENERAL ET DES 




12. See Luis E. Cuervo, The Uncertain Fate of Venezuela’s Black Pearl: The 
Petrostate and its Ambiguous Oil and Gas Legislation, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 637, 678 
(2010). 
13. Elisabeth Eljuri & Victorino J. Tejera Pérez, 21st Century Transformation of 
the Venezuelan Oil Industry, 26 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 475, 484–85 (2008) 
[hereinafter 21st Century Transformation]. 
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regime that included fiscal stabilization clauses, choice of 
external law, and the government’s consent to international 
arbitration.14 This preferential treatment was seen as 
inconsistent with the aims the current administration and 
declared incompatible with its nationalization regime.15 
The reversal of the Apertura led to a legal framework in 
which the Venezuelan government has sought to increase both 
the government’s profit share and its control over the oil 
industry, which will be addressed in Section A. Further, a new 
model contract for Mixed Companies (incorporated joint 
ventures) was established to govern the participation of foreign 
investors in the oil sector.16 Hence, Section B reviews the terms 
of the model and seeks to identify possible imbalances which will 
be reviewed in light of investment protection rights under BITs. 
A. The Establishment of a Legal Framework Based on State 
Control 
The current legal regime regulating hydrocarbons 
in Venezuela is based on a policy that sought to 
recover ”full petroleum sovereignty.”17 The reform started with 
the 1999 approval of a new Constitution, which reaffirmed state 
ownership and control over hydrocarbons and PDVSA.18 A new 
                                               
14. See generally Bernard Mommer, Subversive Oil, in VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN 
THE CHÁVEZ ERA: POLARIZATION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger, 
eds., 2002). 
15. See 21st Century Transformation, supra note 13, at 475, 481. 
16. Two model legal instruments govern the contractual conditions of the Mixed 
Company: 1) Acuerdo Mediante el cual se Aprueban los Términos y Condiciones para la 
Creación y Funcionamiento de las Empresas Mixtas [Resolution Approving the Terms 
and Conditions of the Creation and Operation of Mixed Companies] and 2) Proyecto de 
Acta Constitutiva y Estatutos Sociales de La Empresa Mixta [Model Mixed Company 
Bylaws], Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela [G.O.] No. 38.410, 31 
de marzo de 2006 (Venez.), as amended by G.O. No. 39.273, 28 de septiembre de 2009 
(Venez.) [hereinafter MC Terms and Conditions, and MC Model Bylaws, respectively]. 
17. HILDEGARD RONDÓN DE SANSÓ, EL RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LOS HIDROCARBUROS: 
EL IMPACTO DEL PETRÓLEO EN VENEZUELA 411–26 (2d ed. 2009); see also Rafael Ramírez 
Carreño, Venez. Minister of Energy and Petroleum, Full Sovereignty Over Oil, Speech at 
the Third OPEC International Seminar, (Sept. 2006), transcript available at 
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php? 
tpl=interface.en/design/readsearch.tpl.html&newsid_obj_id=2990&newsid_temas=0. 
18. See Constitución de la República Bolivariana Venezuela, G.O. No. 36.860, 30 de 
diciembre de 1999 (Venez.) [hereinafter 1999 Constitution] Articles 12, 156(12), 156(16), 
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Organic Hydrocarbons Law (OHL) was enacted in 200119 and 
partially reformed in 2006.20 The OHL defined the government’s 
operational control of the oil industry, increased its quota of 
fiscal income, and created the contractual framework for Mixed 
Companies (MCs).21 Some analysts pointed out that such reform 
could be applied only to new investors or investments based on 
the two principles of non-retroactivity, under Article 24 of the 
Venezuelan Constitution and sanctity of contracts.22 
Nevertheless, various factors gave the Venezuelan government 
powerful incentives to impose the new regime on prior 
agreements. These factors included a contract design based on a 
low-price scenario, the obsolete bargain created at the conclusion 
of the private investment cycle of the oil opening and also a 
regressive oil tax framework, which did not include 
contingencies for oil price increases.23 
1. The Takeover of Upstream Operations and Windfall Profit 
Tax (2005–2008) 
During a period of increases in oil prices beginning in 2005, 
the Venezuelan government faced the opportunistic dilemma 
that the net economic benefit of reneging on its contracts was 
greater than the net benefit of complying with those contracts.24 
The government’s initial steps were to unilaterally raise royalty 
rates and income taxes and create a new extraction tax, 
                                               
302, 303. 
19. Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos No. 1510, 2 de 
noviembre de 2001, reprinted in G.O. No. 37.323, 13 de noviembre de 2001 (Venez.) 
[hereinafter OHL]. 
20. Ley de Reforma Parcial del Decreto No. 1510 con Fuerza de Ley Orgánica de 
Hidrocarburos, G.O. No. 38.443, 24 de mayo de 2006 (Venez.), reprinted and corrected in 
G.O. No. 38.493, 4 de agosto de 2006 (Venez.). 
21. See Ramírez Carreño, supra note 17. 
22. Bernard Mommer, Venezuela: A New Legal and Institutional Framework in Oil, 
45(1) Middle East Economic Survey, (2002); see also 21st Century Transformation, supra 
note 13, at 481. 
23. See Osmel Manzano & Francisco Monaldi, The Political Economy of Oil 
Production in Latin America, 9 ECONOMÍA 59, 77 (2008) [hereinafter The Political 
Economy of Oil Production in Latin America]. 
24. O. Manzano and F. Monaldi, The Political Economy of Oil Contract 
Renegotiation in Venezuela, in The Natural Resources Trap, Chapter 12, Massachussets 
Institute of Technology, 2010 (including a specialized financial analysis of the 
renegotiation process). 
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affecting the value of foreign investments.25 Then, 
the government reneged on thirty-two operating agreements, 
two risk-exploration and profit-sharing agreements, and later 
forcibly renegotiated four association agreements for production 
of heavy crude oil operating in the Orinoco Belt.26 The 
agreements were declared illegal, and the government insisted 
on adapting them to the new 2001 OHL.27 In particular, on 
May 1, 2007, the government sent an ultimatum to IOCs 
involved in the association agreements.28 The ultimatum stated 
that if the IOCs did not accept the new scheme, the authorities 
would take control of their operations and threatened to pay 
book value for expropriated assets.29 Indeed, the execution of 
forced renegotiation compelled IOCs to agree to a re-allocation 
into a model of Joint Ventures with PDVSA as the majority 
shareholder.30  
Notwithstanding the high risk of conflict, most companies 
accepted the new terms and decided to stay in Venezuela, partly 
in hopes of securing new opportunities.31 However, ExxonMobil 
and ConocoPhillips resorted instead to international arbitration, 
seeking compensation for the expropriation of their assets.32 
                                               
25. See Id. 
26. Leopoldo Olavarría Campagna, Historical Examples and Recent Latin 
American Experiences in Forced Contract Renegotiation in the Natural Resources 
Sector: Is Risk Mitigation Still Possible?, in Sixtieth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas 
Law § 14 (2009)Id. at 429–40. 
27. Id. at 430. 
28. Id. at 433–34. 
29. Id. at 433–36. During negotiations with Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips, 
Venezuela insisted on paying book value for the expropriated assets. Emily A. Witten, 
Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & 
ENERGY L. 56, 58 (2008). 
30. See Olavarría Campagna, supra note 264. 
31. Witten, supra note 29, at 57; see The Political Economy of Oil Production in 
Latin America, supra note 23, at 61 (stating that even “if the government reneges on the 
contract after large investments have been sunk, the producers would still have 
incentives to continue operating as long as they can recover operational and non-sunk 
costs”); see also Press Release, PDVSA, Seven Multinational Companies Have Migrated 
to Joint Venture Companies (Jun. 26, 2007). 
32. ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30 (registered Dec. 13, 
2007); Mobil Corp. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27 (registered Oct. 10, 2007). 
Both cases are waiting for a decision on the merits. See also Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. 
PDVSA and PDVSA Cerro Negro S.A. (ICC no. 15416/JRF) (2008). Other Companies 
such as ENI and TOTAL also resorted to arbitration, but they eventually settled with 
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a. Windfall Profit Tax Introduction 2008 
Later, as a result of a further increase in oil prices that 
reached $147/barrel in July 2008, the Venezuelan government 
sought greater profits by approving the Law on the Special 
Contribution on Extraordinary Prices in the International 
Hydrocarbons Market.33 This law established a new windfall 
profit tax called Special Contribution that should be added to 
the fiscal regime of royalties and taxes set forth in the OHL.34 
The Special Contribution tax reached 50% when oil prices 
reached $70/barrel, and up to 60% when the price exceeded 
$100/barrel in a given month.35 The tax is paid by exporters of 
natural or upgraded liquid hydrocarbons and derivative 
products.36 
After the implementation of these measures, one could 
expect the end of the reform process. The government, however, 
approved more interventions, which increased state control over 
the oil sector. The Venezuelan government continued acting 
based on its assumption that its huge onshore reserves of 
crude oil, the country’s low geological risk, and the lack of 
opportunities for big upstream projects in other oil-rich 
countries, gave the government a strong bargaining position 
with foreign companies.37  
2. The Takeover of Service Companies and the Windfall Profit 
Tax Reform (2008–2011) 
The global financial crisis and the consequent economic 
recession had significant effects on the oil industry. Oil 
                                               
the Venezuelan government and decided to remain in the country 
33. Ley de Contribución Especial Sobre Precios Extraordinarios Del Mercado 
Internacional de Hidrocarburos, G.O. No. 38.910, 15 de abril de 2008 (Venez.). 
34. Elisabeth Eljuri, The New Latin American Oil and Gas Scene: Taking the High 





37. See Isobel Rea, Accessing oil and gas reserves: Rethinking upstream offers by 
international oil companies, ACCENTURE,http://www.accenture.com/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture_ 
Resources_Accessing_oil_and_gas_reserves_Mar2009_LR_EiaB5_.pdf. 
2011] REBALANCING OIL CONTRACTS IN VENEZUELA 243 
consumption fell, oil prices collapsed in late 2008, and access to 
credit for investment projects contracted.38 Although the 
new circumstances stood to weaken the government’s position 
subsequent actions did not seem to take into account the effects 
of the world economic crisis. Between September 2008 and late 
2009, the government’s moves further increased its absorption of 
private industry. The government, directly or indirectly, 
expropriated or forcibly bought a broad spectrum of 
investments, both foreign and domestic, including cement and 
steel companies and investments in the oil sector.39 Three new 
laws were enacted giving the state control over 
certain activities and assets in the oil industry: 1) The Act on 
Reorganization of the Internal Market of Liquid 
Fuels,40 2) The Law Reserving State Rights to Petrochemical 
Activity, Basic and Intermediate,41 and 3) The Organic Law 
Reserving State Property and Related Services to Primary 
Hydrocarbon Activities (RLSC).42 
Interestingly, the RLSC was passed amid 
conflict between the government and a number of service 
companies, over PDVSA’s outstanding invoices with 
these companies.43 PDVSA sought discounts of 20% to 30% to 
reduce its substantial debt with services providers.44 After 
                                               
38. See Jad Mouawad, Big Oil Projects Put in Jeopardy by Fall in Prices, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A1. 
39. Oscar Garibaldi, Is Your Company Adequately Protected From the Continuing 
Nationalization of Foreign Investments in Venezuela and Other Countries?, Feb. 17, 
2010, Available at: http://www.cov.com/ogaribaldi/. 
40. Ley Orgánica de Reordenamiento del Mercado Interno de los Combustibles 
Líquidos, G.O. No. 39.019, 18 de septiembre de 2008 (Venez.). 
41. Ley Orgánica para el Desarrollo de las Actividades Petroquímicas, G.O. No. 
39.203, 18 de junio de 2009 (Venez.). 
42. Ley Orgánica Que Reserva Al Estado Bienes y Servicios Conexos a las 
Actividades Primarias de Hidrocarburos, G.O., No. 39.173, 7 de mayo de 2009 (Venez.) 
[hereinafter RLSC]. 
43. See Suhelis Tejero Puntes, PDVSA exige a las contratistas reducir sus tarifas en 
40%, EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.), Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.eluniversal.com/ 
2009/02/27/eco_art_pdvsa-exige-a-las-co_1283195.shtml. 
44. Elizabeth Eljuri & Clovis Treviño, Political Risk Management in Light of 
Venezuela’s Partial Nationalization of the Oilfield Services Sector, 28 NO. 3 J. ENERGY & 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 375, 381 (2010) [hereinafter Political Risk Management]; Owen L. 
Anderson, Introduction, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 271, 275 (2007) (“The debt crisis in various 
regions of the developing world, especially South America, is one reason for the new 
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failing to reach an agreement with several service 
companies, the government enacted the RLSC and a series of 
MPPEP resolutions instructing PDVSA to take control of 
operations and immediate possession of the facilities and 
equipment owned by the service companies.45 
Some observers worried about the government’s tendency to 
use primarily legislative power to resolve situations of 
commercial conflict applying expropriation measures.46 In this 
regard, Eljuri and Treviño have questioned whether the 
enactment of the RLSC was a short-sighted measure to address 
a serious cash-flow problem, or whether this nationalistic move 
might have a reasonable business justification.47 With respect to 
the RLSC, Derman and Miskel stated that: 
Venezuela’s legislature has declared that service firms 
be paid the book value of any expropriated 
assets, and that the Venezuelan government would 
have the option of paying for the assets with bonds 
instead of cash. In this attempt to avoid paying the full 
market value compensation required under 
international law, the legislature also sets forth that all 
controversies under the new law must be resolved by 
Venezuelan courts.48 
According to Minister Ramírez, thirty-two service companies 
have acquiesced to agreements with the government about debt 
discounts and tariff reduction.49 Some companies, however, have 
sought international arbitration in response to the seizure of 
                                               
wave of nationalism that has brought leaders such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez to 
power.”). 
45. Political Risk Management, supra note 44, at 381 (explaining that the RLSC 
gives the national executive the authority to order expropriation of shares or assets of 
companies providing those services under the Expropriation Law for Public and Social 
Use, but also that the Reserve Law does not explicitly state when compensation is due 
for such a taking). 
46. Id. 
47. Elizabeth Eljuri & Clovis Treviño, Venezuela: On the Path to Complete “Oil 
Sovereignty,” or the Beginning of a New Era of Investment?, 2 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & 
BUS. 259, 260 (2009) [hereinafter “Oil Sovereignty” or Investment?]. 
48. Andrew B Derman & Emily A. Miskel, Venezuelan Oil Seizure: Not a License to 
Steal, INDUSTRY TODAY, June 5, 2009 http://www.industrytoday.com/ 
article_view.asp?ArticleID=we173. 
49. Frank Jack Daniel, Venezuela Says Will Pay for Nationalized H&P Rigs, 
REUTERS, June 26, 2010. 
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their assets. For instance, the oil service company Tidewaters 
Inc. filed a request for arbitration with the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) seeking 
compensation for eleven Tidewater ships seized by the 
Venezuelan authorities.50 Likewise, Universal Compression 
International and the Williams Cos. Inc. also filed arbitration 
against Venezuela before the ICSID for the takeover of their 
facilities.51  
b. Windfall Profit Tax Reform 2011 
In April 2011 President Hugo Chavez repealed the 2008 
Windfall Profit Tax Law.52 Four tiers of taxes on oil prices 
emerged as a result: 1) The lowest tier is 20%, applicable to 
“extraordinary” oil prices between the price fixed by 
the Venezuelan budget for the relevant fiscal year ($40 per 
barrel for 2011) and $70 per barrel ($/b); 2) next, the tax reaches 
80% on “exorbitant” oil prices more than $70/b but less than 
$90/b; 3) it expands to 90% when prices are more than $90/b but 
less than $100/b; and 4) it peaks at 95% when oil prices exceed 
$100/b.53 Curiously, Article 14 of the reform caps the royalty and 
export tax set forth in the Hydrocarbons Organic Law at $70 per 
barrel. It is still far from clear whether the new law may 
suspend the application of a tax regime established in the 
Hydrocarbons Organic Law, which has a superior level in the 
hierarchy of Laws in Venezuela. The reform affects directly all 
the projects exporting oil or selling oil to PDVSA. However, 
articles 12 and 13 set forth a number of waivers which have to 
be considered on case by case basis by the MPPEP, for projects 
which increase oil production, or which has not recovered the 
investment, or projects in the framework of cooperation 
                                               
50. Tidewaters v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, (Barbaros-Venezuela BIT) 
Procedural Order No 1 on Production of Documents ¶ 2 (Mar. 29, 2011). 
51. See The Williams Companies et al. v. Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/10) 
(registred Apr. 20, 2011) and Universal Compression v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/9 (registered Apr. 12, 2010). 
52. Decreto con rango, valor y fuerza de Ley que crea contribución especial por 
precios extraordinarios y exorbitantes en el mercado internacional de hidrocarburos. No. 
8.163 G.O. Ext. 6.022. 18 de abril 2011. 
53. Idem. 
246 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol.  33:2 
agreements.54 The new regulations turned in a complex tax 
model that requires harmonization through MPPEP’s 
resolutions, still pending, increasing the uncertainty application 
of the fiscal regime since there is a lack of clarity on several 
issues.55 
The number of reforms being enacted does not leave any 
shred of doubt about the Venezuelan government’s 
determination to ensure that its objectives are given priority 
above those of the business ventures when these objectives 
conflict.56 
The interviews in Caracas showed that the trend of 
instability in the legal framework is the main cause of concern 
for investors in the Venezuelan oil sector. On this point, the 
manager of an oil company operating in Venezuela commented 
that foreigners working in Venezuela “do not know what to 
expect. The government can enact a new law whenever it likes, 
changing the rules of the game.”57 Similarly, another manager 
stated: 
Many times we get notice of reforms through the press 
or the Official Gazette. We are required to continually 
adapt to new regulations, and on this you have two 
options: either to adapt or to leave. For many, leaving is 
not an option because we have placed investments in 
the country that are not so easy to withdraw. However, 
                                               
54. Id. 
55. Preliminary analysis shows that by placing a cap on the royalty and export tax, 
the reform reduces the revenues paid to the Venezuelan Central Bank that should be 
transferred to the National Budget controlled by the Legislative. Instead, it increases 
payments to the National Development Fund (FONDEN), an off-budget spending vehicle 
under exclusive control of the Executive. Thus, the new redistribution seems to agree 
more with government strategy seeking cash flow for the presidential elections of 2012, 
rather than a new balance of revenues distribution between the Government and IOCs. 
These, so far, remain prudent in a wait-and-see approach. See also, Harvest Natural 
Resources Announces 2011 First Quarter Results, available at http://www.harvestnr.com. 
56. See, e.g., Rod Walton, Venezuela Seizes Rigs Owned by Tulsa-based Helmerich 
& Payne, TULSA WORLD, June 24. 2010. (Noting that after the RLSC was enacted, the 
service provider Helmerich & Payne kept 11 idle drilling rigs because PDVSA failed to 
pay for the services. Since no agreement was reached about discounted rates and tariffs 
after a year of negotiations, PDVSA opted to take the drills). Subsequently, the National 
Assembly declared the take over of the 11 drills in the public interest on June 30, 2010 
through the Decree No. 7.532, G.O. No. 39.456, 30 de Junio de 2010. ). 
57. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (Aug. 29, 2009). 
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these circumstances increase the risk, and could cause 
underinvestment cycles.58 
The full petroleum sovereignty policy was implemented at a 
time when oil prices allowed the government to significantly 
increase its revenues and, in many cases, allowed the 
authorities to settle with foreign investors after expropriation. 
However, it seems the negative effects of the global recession on 
the Venezuelan economy have reduced the government’s 
financial leeway to reach agreements for the takeover of private 
assets, increasing the risk of litigation in the country. Thus, the 
policy could also be evaluated in terms of costs. First, the final 
result of litigation cases could require Venezuela to compensate 
foreign investors.59 Second, the legal framework’s lack of 
stability could adversely affect the level of investments in the 
country. The greater government control over the industry and 
the constant risk of legislation changes have potentially 
generated imbalances, raising the level of political risk and 
limiting foreign investors’ capacity to invest as planned. As 
Eljuri and Treviño mentioned in 2009, the issues are whether 
“the recent nationalization cycles [will] lead to 
underinvestment” and whether “PDVSA’s increasing control 
over the Venezuelan oil industry [will] lead to production 
inefficiencies and declining oil output.”60 
To further analyze this situation, the next Section will study 
the investment contract for Mixed Companies and will look for 
imbalances in a number of specific provisions that could affect 
the efficiency of the contractual framework to guarantee foreign 
investment. 
                                               
58. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (Aug. 11, 2009). 
59. See Interview by Ernesto Villegas with Bernard Mommer, former Vice Minister 
of Hydrocarbons for Energy and Petroleum and Director of PDVSA, in Caracas, Venez. 
(Feb. 12, 2008) English transcript available at http://www.pdvsa.com/ 
index.php?tpl=interface.sp/design/readmenu.tpl. 
html&newsid_obj_id=5532&newsid_temas=80 [hereinafter Mommer Interview]. 
Regarding the expropriation of ExxonMobil, Bernard Mommer declared, “We cancelled 
that partnership, expropriated the assets and own them compensation.” Id. A summary 
of this interesting interview is available at: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=kENv_qeA9zE. 
60. “Oil Sovereignty” or Investment, supra note 47, at 262. 
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B. Imbalances in the Contractual Framework for Mixed 
Companies 
The Mixed Company contract is an investment contract 
drafted according to Articles 33 and 34 of the OLH.61 The 
parties to this Joint Venture model are the state entity, 
Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo (CVP),62 which is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of PDVSA for upstream activities, and the 
private foreign corporation. The MC contract model has been 
standardized and approved by the National Assembly and 
consists of several stages which comprise Executive and 
Legislative intervention: 
1. CVP and the foreign company (IOC or NOC) sign a 
memorandum of understanding. 
2. A draft of the MC contract is prepared according to 
the terms of the tender or via direct negotiation. At 
this point, the MPPEP exercises control over the 
contractual provisions (Executive Control). 
Additionally, the National Executive should approve 
a decree assigning the geographical area of 
activities and a decree granting the entity right to 
carry out primary activities. 
3. The National Assembly approves the National 
Assembly Agreement for the Constitution of the MC 
with the framework conditions of the MC contract 
(Art. 33 OHL). According to Article 150 of the 
Venezuelan Constitution, contracts of public 
interest must be approved by the National 
Assembly (Legislative Control). 
4. The MC contract is signed between CVP and the 
foreign investor following the general terms and 
conditions established in the OHL: a) rights and 
duties of each party, b) the term of the contract (25 
years plus 15 years upon request 5 years before its 
expiration, c) area delimitation, d) conditions of use 
and later delivery to the MPPEP, e) 
decommissioning with the least environmental and 
economic damage, f) business Plan and budget 
                                               
61. See OHL, supra note 19. 
62. 21st Century Transformation, supra note 13, at 480 (explaining that CVP is 
used as the corporate vehicle in Mixed Companies formed with foreign partners). 
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provisions for upstream activities, g) the obligation 
of oil sale of hydrocarbons to PDVSA, and h) 
provisions on dispute resolution and applicable law 
and jurisdiction.63 
5. The MC Bylaws are also signed by CVP and the 
foreign company, thus establishing the 
decision-making provisions and dividends 
provisions.64 
According to George Kahale, the new model grants the state 
power over three significant aspects of the contract: 1) 
economic: by increasing the government’s profit share, 2) 
corporate governance: giving government control over the MC’s 
operations, and 3) legal: by eliminating stabilization clauses and 
reducing access to arbitration.65  
After the model had been in place for four years, the 
research underlying this article was undertaken to assess how 
effectively the MC contract was functioning. To this end, a series 
of interviews were conducted in Caracas with oil company 
executives and government officials. Two major operational and 
legal concerns were identified: 1) government control of oil 
management and sales and 2) limitations on contractual 
investor’s protection rights. 
Different measures have been taken to ensure the feasibility 
of the MC contract to different projects. MCs operating in the 
Orinoco Belt receive special treatment in some contractual 
provisions compared with MCs operating in other regions of the 
country. Since the Orinoco Belt operating companies work in the 
production of heavy oil, the contract is adapted to provide more 
operative and commercial control to foreign companies. Thus, 
these particular measures will be referred to as “Orinoco Belt 
exceptions.” 
1. Controls over Management and Oil Sales 
The study of government control over the management and 
the commercialization of crude is organized in the following two 
                                               
63. MC Terms and Conditions, supra note 16. 
64. 21st Century Transformation, supra note 13, at 480. 
65. George Kahale, Conference Paper, Tendencias en Contratos Aguas Arriba en la 
Industria Petrolera Internacional 2–10 (July 2009), available at http://www.pdvsa.com/ 
interface.sp/database/ fichero/free/4998/637.PDF. 
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sections: (a) State Control over the Corporate Governance of the 
MC, and (b) Control on the Sale of Hydrocarbons and the 
Associated Cash Flow Constraints Imposed on Investors. 
a.  State Control over the Corporate Governance of 
Mixed Companies 
Article 22 of the OHL establishes that CVP should be a 
majority shareholder of more than 50% of an MC that actually 
reaches a participation of 60% in all projects.66 Because the 
MC is the operator of the project, the leadership of the company 
depends upon CVP.67 Therefore, based on the composition of the 
shareholders’ meeting (the highest governing body in the MC), 
CVP maintains control over the day-to-day management of the 
MC based upon decisions of a simple majority and approval of 
the annual work programs and budgets under Article 16 of the 
MC Bylaws.68 This management model is considerably more 
restrictive than the systems of “golden shares,” where the state 
holds the right to take certain decisions without necessarily 
assuming the role of operator.69 But it is worth pointing out that 
the same article sets forth a number of limits upon the decision 
power of CVP for the protection of investor’s interest.70 For 
example, CVP must not act against the interests of the MC or 
put the execution of the contract at risk. 
Given the high level of state control, the foreign company’s 
co-participant risk is increased, and the effectiveness of the 
model relies on the optimal performance of PDVSA.71 According 
                                               
66. OHL, supra note 19, art. 22. 
67. Kahale, supra note 65, at 7. 
68. MC Model Bylaws, supra note 16. 
69. See MIGUEL A. GARCÍA-CESTONA & VICENTE SALAS, GOLDEN SHARES AND 
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL APPROACH 3 (2005) available at http://163.152.84.199/ 
data/4th/session1/1B/ 03Miguel% 20Garcia%20Cestona.pdf (describing golden shares as 
“a tool that allows the Government to retain veto power over a certain set of future 
decisions in the privatized firm”). 
70. MC Model Bylaws, supra note 16. Article 16.I.c “(…) being understood that the 
simple majority shall not take decisions contrary to the interests of the Corporation, 
including, among others, any decision which would result in the revocation of the 
transfer Decree or of any permit, license or authorization of any kind required for the 
conduct of the Corporation’s business, or in the early termination or breach of the 
Contract for the Purchase and Sale of Hydrocarbons (…)” 
71. David Hults, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.: The Right-Hand Man of the 
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to some observers, this new role of National Oil Companies 
(NOCs)—competing for control with IOCs—is an example of 
how oil majors have apparently become mere suppliers of capital 
and technology, serving at the behest of NOCs.72 One of the 
managers interviewed on this regard stated that “[t]he problem 
is not that the Mixed Company model cannot work correctly, the 
problem is that the current efficiency in the operability of 
PDVSA is undercutting performance and affecting the value of 
the investment.”73 
According to the interviewees, two interrelated causes 
have influenced the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
model: the highly politicized state companies and the lack of 
human resources in the domestic industry. 
i. The Highly Politicized State Companies 
Under the MC decision-making model, the interviewees 
emphasized the existence of high levels of political intervention 
of the Venezuelan government in PDVSA: One concluded that, 
“the Mixed Companies do not act independently as operators 
because substantial governmental control exists over the 
decisions that are taken in each of them.”74 Another 
remarked that any decision by state officials depends upon 
consultations at the highest levels of the Venezuelan 
government.75 This situation may create a gap based on 
asymmetric information between PDVSA and the foreign 
investor, which could affect the feasibility of the model. 
ii.  The Lack of Human Resources in the Domestic Industry: 
According to the officials interviewed, PDVSA has not 
recovered from the loss of half of its qualified workforce, 
fired after massive strikes in 2002 and 2003 in the oil 
                                               
Government, 6–21, (The Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working 
Paper No. 70, 2007), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22067/ 
Hults%2C_PdVSA_case_study%2C_WP_70.pdf/. 
72. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy: An 
“Eventful” Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 545 (2005–2006). 
73. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (Aug. 11, 2009). 
74. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (July. 29, 2009). 
75. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (Aug.. 11, 2009). 
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industry.76 Additionally, the personnel dismissed from PDVSA 
and subsequently hired by IOCs based in Venezuela have not 
been allowed to work in the operations of the MCs.77 ”I have had 
to remove Venezuelan, ex-PDVSA workers, and to assign 
them to other operations abroad because they are not allowed to 
work in the MCs,” commented one manager.78 
Both problems can affect the operational capacity of the 
projects and, consequently, the levels of oil production.79 The 
consequences are obscured by the public debate over Venezuela’s 
oil production levels: Figures released by the Venezuelan 
government indicate oil production of more than 3 million 
barrels/day,80 but the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
estimates oil production at around 2.6 million barrels/day.81 
Juan Carlos Boué, MPPEP’s Senior Advisor, has argued that 
IEA figures are based on secondary sources that exclude the 
output of extra heavy crude from the Orinoco Belt, creating the 
600,000 barrels/day gap.82 
Adding to the perception that Venezuelan production is 
declining, Minister Ramírez asked MCs in late 2010 to increase 
their output and investment, and he threatened to “review the 
rights that were granted” to any companies that did not increase 
their productivity.83 In sum, even the best scenario shows that 
the production capacity has remained at a standstill during the 
last decade and the government is now facing the need to 
increase production and revenues. 
                                               
76. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO), Energy Security: Issues Related to 
Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production, 6 (2006), available at 
http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/ venezuela/pdf/GAO_Report_Venezuela.pdf. 
77. Human Rights Watch, A Decade under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost 
Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela 29 (2008). 
78. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (July. 29, 2009). 
79. See U.S. GAO, supra note 76, at 6. 
80. John Kingston, The Numbers in Venezuela, THE BARREL (July 13, 2007, 4:48 
PM), http://www.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/. 
81. Gregory Wilpert & Michael Fox, International Energy Agency Increases 
Venezuela’s Oil Production Estimates, Maybe, VOITAIRENET.ORG, May 20, 2006, 
http://www.voitairenet.org/ article139141.html. 
82. Juan Carlos Boue, How Much Oil Has Venezuela Really Been Producing?, 
MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY, May 4, 2009. 
83. Jose Orozco & Charlie Devereaux, Venezuela Partners to Boost Oil Spending, 
Ramirez Says, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 27, 2011. 
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  Orinoco Belt Exception 
The decision-management model can be found in the MC 
contract in two forms: 1) those from MCs operating in the 
Northeast or Northwest of the country or those based upon the 
nationalization of the thirty-two operating agreements where 
the Business Plan and the Annual Budget can be decided by 
simple majority under the sole discretion of CVP, and 2) the 
MCs operating in the Orinoco Belt, such as Petromonagas, 
Petropiar and Petrocedeño, where the approval of the 
Business Plan and the Annual Budget requires a qualified 
majority of the shareholders.84 The latter model grants major 
decision-making power to the investing company as to the 
operation of the project and cost control. Furthermore, the 
investigation indicated that in cases where CVP/PDVSA 
were unable to lead the operation, it hired a private company to 
perform this role in coordination with the operator in order to 
obtain better levels of efficiency. Such a situation seems feasible, 
according to the OHL, as long as the PDVSA operator’s function 
does not become denaturalized.85 
b. The Controls on Oil Sale, The Risk of Nonpayment and Cash 
Flow Constraints 
Articles 27, 56, and 57 of the OHL provide that the sale of 
hydrocarbons is controlled by the State.86 The MC contract 
establishes the MC’s obligation to sell oil to PDVSA or any other 
company the state selects for such purposes through a contract 
for sale and purchase of hydrocarbons.87 Additionally, the sale 
price would be fixed by accounting methods included in the 
Annex A of the Contract of Sale or in Regulations approved by 
the MPPEP.88 
                                               
84. See Decree No. 5.664, PetroCedeño S.A., Decree No. 5.667, PetroMonagas S.A. 
and Decree No. 5.668, PetroPiar S.A. published in the G.O. No. 38.807 November 9, 
2007. 
85. OHL, supra note 19, arts. 25, 28. 
86. Id. arts. 27, 56, & 57. 
87. MC Terms and Conditions, Clause on Hydrocarbons Sales, supra note 16. 
88. Contract to Sell and Purchase of Hydrocarbons. Calculation of Payments 
Provision: “The intention of the Parties is that the formulas contained in this Annex A 
should adequately reflect the long term export value to the relevant markets of the crude 
oil delivered, in the understanding that no request for adjustment may be based on 
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This situation embodies a further risk of nonpayment89 
by PDVSA, as was observed in the case of several service 
companies.90 Recent experience has shown that PDVSA could 
suffer cash flow difficulties in honoring its obligations for two 
distinct reasons: 1) the abrupt reduction of revenues when oil 
prices dropped, as occurred in 2008 and 2009,91 or 2) because of 
its role in implementing political aims of the Venezuelan 
government during electoral campaigns. A group of IOC 
employees operating in Venezuela reported having experienced 
this situation in late 2008: “[M]ore than one year passed before 
we received the first payment for oil sales. PDVSA delayed 
payment to those . . . it knew could financially resist.”92 
Concerning the risk of non-payment, it is worth noting that 
a force majeure provision is incorporated in Article 9 of the 
Contract of Sales of Hydrocarbons, establishing different events 
of non-liability for losses or damages resulting from 
interruptions, reductions or delays in the delivery or receipt of 
hydrocarbons.93 However, it sets forth that “[n]o event of force 
majeure shall excuse the failure to pay any amount due in 
accordance with this Contract by either of the Parties,” giving 
minimum protection to private investors.94 
Private investors in the MC benefit via dividend distribution 
after the State has collected all taxes and make payments. 
Responding to this situation, Eulogio Del Pino, President of 
CVP, declared that PDVSA had to wait until the end of the fiscal 
                                               
disagreements regarding such value in the short term, or the use of Merey 16 as the 
reference crude oil.” 
89. Sebastien Manciaux, The Notion of Investment: New Controversies, 9 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 453, 456 (2009). 
90. Political Risk Management, supra note 44, at 5–6 (noting that in August 2007, 
PDVSA stopped paying a number of oil services companies and by May 2009 had 
accumulated about $12 billion in debt with these companies). 
91. See, e.g., J. Scott Childs, Continental Cap-and-Trade: Canada, the United 
States, and Climate Change Partnership in North America, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 393, 444 
(2010) (noting that, “the global recession of 2008 and 2009 caused oil prices to 
plummet”). 
92. Personal interview, in Houston, USA. (Sept. 2009). 
93. Harvest Natural Resources, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), Contract for 
Sale and Purchase of Hydrocarbons, Annex K, art. 9 (2007). 
94. Id. 
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year to pay dividends to foreign partners in the MC.95 To reduce 
the risk of cash flow constraints to the IOCs, Del Pino also 
explained that in a scenario of high prices PDVSA requests from 
“the MC a budget of investment and expenditures” in order to 
“declare anticipated dividends,” based on Article 32 of the MC 
Bylaws.96 
  Orinoco Belt Exception 
Different arrangements have been approved on this matter 
for the projects in the Orinoco Belt. The government has given 
those MCs whose primary activity is producing heavy crude oil 
in the Orinoco Belt the right ”to commercialize and to 
sell refined crude oil and any other resulting product of the 
improvement of petroleum,” according to Article 3 of MC 
contract.97 This distinction gives companies greater control over 
cash flow in projects involving greater investment and narrower 
profitability, offering a different balance for MC in the Orinoco 
Belt. 
After the review of these operational and commercial issues, 
this study will examine the second element of concern, limits 
imposed on contractual investor’s protection rights. 
2. Contractual Restrictions of Investors’ rights in Light of 
BITs 
During the nationalistic reform the government has taken 
different actions to retain control over the MC Contract based on 
the Calvo Doctrine98, such as: 1) excluding stabilization clauses 
from the MC contract, 2) restricting access to international 
arbitration, and 3) providing exclusive choice of Venezuelan law 
as governing law to the contract.99 Nevertheless, these measures 
should be reviewed in light of international standards 
                                               
95. Interview by Jeanne Liendo with Eulogio del Pino, Dir., PDVSA (Oct. 29, 2008) 
transcript available at http://www.revistamene.com/nuevo/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=90& Itemid=56. 
96. MC Model Bylaws, Art. 32, supra note 16. 
97. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
98. Oscar Garibaldi, Calvo Redivivus: The Rediscovery of the Calvo Doctrine In the 
Era of Investment Treaties, The Proceedings of the 57th Annual Institute on Oil and Gas 
Law Procedures (2006). 
99. Id. 
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incorporated into the Venezuelan network of BITs in order to 
assets their final effect.100 
a. The Exclusion of Stabilization Clauses in the Mixed 
Company Contract 
Facing the risk of harmful legislative interference, the 
international oil industry implemented the practice of 
stabilization clauses—freezing the tax legislation to the date 
when the contract is concluded—to reduce ex post facto 
opportunism of the host government.101 Stabilization provisions 
entered into by states and foreign investors are considered 
binding upon the state under international law.102 Although 
these provisions have not been interpreted as limiting the state’s 
sovereign right to legislate or expropriate, they could justify the 
award of damages for breach of contract.103 Nonetheless, when 
the equilibrium of a contract containing a stabilization clause is 
undermined, a sharp conflict may ensue to the detriment of both 
parties.104 In particular, Professors Dolzer and Schreuer have 
pointed out that over the last decade, reliance on such clauses 
has decreased in practice, mainly in deference to the sovereignty 
of the host state.105 For instance, Venezuela is one of these 
                                               
100. List of BITs signed by the Venezuelan Government available at: Comision 
Nacional de Promoción de Inversiones (CONAPRI) (Venez.).: http://www.conapri.org/ 
articledetails.asp?articleid= 216437. 
101. A. Z. El Chiati, Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum 
Agreements, 4 HAGUE ACADEMY COLLECTED COURSES 1, 114–15 (1987). 
102. Nicolas David, Les clauses de stabilité dans les contrats pétroliers, Questions 
d’un praticien, 1 J. DU DROIT INT’L 79 (1986) ; see also Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. 
Libya, 53 I.L.R 389, 478–79 (1978) (stating that “nationalization cannot prevail over an 
internationalized contract containing stabilization clauses”). 
103. Pierre Mayer, La neutralisation du pouvoir normatif de l’Etat en matière de 
contrats d’Etat, 113 J.D.I. 5, 50–51 (1986); see also Liamco v. Libya, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1997). 
104. Anne van Aaken, Commitment and Flexibility: The Fragile Stability of the 
International Investment Protection Regime, 1 (Univ. of St. Gallen Law Sch., Working 
Paper No. 2008-23, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1269416 (explaining that 
“[i]f substantive rules or review mechanisms place too much of a constraint on 
sovereignty without allowing for flexibility, that might precipitate a backlash by states”). 
105. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 75 (2008). Critics of stabilization clauses that freeze the host state 
legislation are not scarce, and some have proposed adaptation clauses allowing equitable 
adjustments and good faith negotiation following civil law principles. Id. As pointed out 
by Prof. A. El Chiati, “the Host Countries do not dispute the fact that the contract is the 
2011] REBALANCING OIL CONTRACTS IN VENEZUELA 257 
cases. The government has refused to accept limitations upon 
its legislative power and similarly refused to compensate oil 
companies for legislative reforms affecting oil contracts.106 This 
adverse reaction reduces the investors’ predictability on 
long-term agreements and increases their exposure to unilateral 
amendments. Likewise, Article 33 OHL sets forth the 
government’s right to unilaterally amend the MC’s terms and 
conditions issued through the “National Assembly Agreement,” 
which governs the MC contract, comprising, among others 
issues, tax provisions.107 Facing this situation, foreign investors 
might move to different contractual provisions and BIT’s 
substantive international standards for stability. 
i. Additional Sources of Contract Stability 
Articles 17 and 18 of the Venezuelan Investment Law allow 
for “legal stability agreements” between the state and the 
foreign investor to freeze the tax legislation for periods up to ten 
years,108however, these agreements have so far not been 
implemented. 
Other approaches suggests that given that the MC contracts 
have been delegated to CVP as a state enterprise, a question 
                                               
law of the parties and as such should not be altered or amended except by their mutual 
agreement. They do, however, contend that long-term contracts are founded on good 
faith and co-operation. Accordingly, they should be permitted to evolve with changes in 
circumstances which could not be predicted at the time of contracting. In their view, the 
clause rebus sic stantibus is implied in all contracts.” Chiati, supra note 101. However, 
Professors Dolzer & Schreuer assert that the “practicability and usefulness [of the 
adaptation and renegotiation provisions] remain to be tested in practice” since “a duty to 
renegotiate relies on the continued good will of both parties,” which may not be useful in 
a dispute. “Thus, it is far from clear whether a duty to renegotiate will serve the 
practical needs of a long-term investment.” DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 105. 
106. See Political Risk Management, supra note 44, at 13 (explaining that contracts 
in the 1990s provided an indemnification clause in which PDVSA would directly 
compensate aggrieved companies “for adverse economic situations resulting from 
adoption of governmental decisions or changes in the legislation which causes a 
discriminatory treatment of the AA or PDVSA´s partner.” 
107. OHL, supra note 19, art. 33 (“Any subsequent amendment of such conditions 
shall also be approved by the National Assembly with the prior favorable report of the 
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the Permanent Commission of Energy and 
Mines.”). 
108. Ley de Promoción y Protección de Inversiones arts. 17, 18, G.O. No. 5390, 22 
de octubre de 1999 (Venez.) [hereinafter Venezuela Investment Law]. 
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arises on the observance of such contract obligations in the 
interface between CVP, the foreign investor and the regulatory 
authority of the Venezuelan government. In this regard, 
Professor Thomas Wälde asserted that if a state enterprise has 
entered into a contract with a private party, and if this contract 
or a state entity action can be attributed to the state, then the 
state has entered into a commitment and is obliged to respect 
it.109 For instance, Article 8 of the MC Contract extends the 
consent requirement of the foreign investor commonly found in 
intangibility clauses,110 and provides that the contract cannot 
“be amended without the prior written consent of the 
Parties.”111 Thus, any CVP action that attempts to alter the 
terms of the agreement must be done in good faith and with the 
written consent of the foreign investor, providing a source of 
contract stability. Additionally, a question arises on whether 
Article 8 might be attributed to the government as a negation of 
clauses exorbitantes du droit commun, commonly found in state 
contracts,112 and therefore, converting this clause to a duty of 
the state as a party on the agreement.113 
ii. The Umbrella Clause as a BIT source of Contract Stability 
In cases involving a breach of contract, the parties to the MC 
may invoke the “Applicable Law and Jurisdiction” clause, which 
provides for the exclusive resort of local courts. However, foreign 
investors may be unwilling to submit their disputes before 
                                               
109. T. W. Wälde, Arbitration in the Oil, Gas and Energy Field: Emerging Energy 
Charter Treaty Practice, OGEL, Sept. 2003 at 21–22; see also Noble v. Romania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/11, Award (Oct. 12, 2005). But see Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 316(b) (Apr. 22, 2005) (stating the 
tribunal had no jurisdiction over claims stemming from any alleged contract breach by 
public entities). 
110. See Prosper Weil, Les Clauses de Stabilisation ou d’Intangibilité Insérées dans 
les Accords de Développement Economique, in MELANGES OFFERTS A CHARLES ROUSSEAU 
307–08 (A. Pedone ed., 1974) (stating that intangibility clauses attempt to circumvent 
the state’s exercise of its public authority in contracts). 
111. Contract for Conversion to a Mixed Company between CVP, Harvest Vinccler 
and H.N.R. Finance B.V., September 11, 2007, Article 8 Amendments and Waivers. 
Harvest Natural Resources (Form-10-Q U.S. SEC) [hereafter MC Contract CVP-Harvest-
Vinccler]. 
112. Ahmed El Kosheri, International Arbitration and Petroleum Contracts. 
Encyclopedia of Hydrocarbons. Vol. IV, 2007 pp. 884-885. 
113. Wälde, supra note 109, at 22. 
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Venezuelan tribunals.114 If a foreign investor has the protection 
of a BIT, a question arises as to whether an “umbrella clause” 
elevates any breach of contract by a state or a state entity to the 
level of a breach of the treaty.115 A negative answer may argue 
that an umbrella clause only applies to contractual obligations 
entered by the state, and not by its instrumentalities. Thus, the 
investor should demand the State-owned entity in local courts, 
and State responsibility before the Arbitral Tribunal. However, 
this conclusion would simply allow governments to avoid 
responsibility by creating and delegating its power to private 
companies.116 
In contrast, a positive answer to the question requires the 
analysis of different elements. In cases where the state 
instrumentality is a party to the contract, the investor’s contract 
claim before a BIT Arbitral Tribunal will require proving: 1) the 
action of the state entity can be attributed to the state as if the 
government had undertaken them, or 2) that a BIT provision 
provides the “liability” of state actions as well as actions of its 
instrumentalities, as occurs in the 2006 French BIT model and 
the 2004 U.S. BIT model.117 The latter case does not seem 
applicable to the Venezuelan context because Venezuelan BITs 
                                               
114. Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt 
Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving 
Corporate Accountability, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 703, 715 n.90 (2005) (“Although countries 
such as Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela have been 
deemed adequate forums by various U.S. courts, the U.S. State Department reports that 
fair trials and due process are often unavailable in those forums.”). 
115. Iona Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International 
Law of Foreign Investment 195 (2008). The umbrella clause requires “compliance with 
investment contracts, or other undertakings of the host State to the BIT’s substantive 
standards. In this way, a violation of such a contract becomes a violation of the BIT.” Id. 
For example, some Venezuelan BITs have incorporated the umbrella clause from BITs 
with Spain, Belarus, Russia, Barbados, The United Kingdom, and Argentina. The typical 
version used is: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to the treatment of investments of nationals or companies of the 
other Contracting Party.” The term “any” in this Article involves treaty and contract 
obligations entered into by the State. Id. 
116. Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State Under International Law for the 
Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 142, 
163 (2010). 
117. See Id. at 152; see also Draft Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, France (2006); Draft Agreement Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, United States (2004). 
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lack liability provisions for the actions of a state entity. 
However, the former case requires that 1) the state entity and 
its relevant conduct can be extended to the state, and 2) the 
breach of contract must constitute a violation of an international 
obligation.118 Attributing the state owned entity’s conduct to the 
state could be attempted in two ways. The first method is 
through piercing of the corporate veil, allowed if the tribunal 
determines the state entity’s conduct constitutes an abuse of 
legal personality.119 Second, commentators and arbitrators 
agree that the “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts” of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) currently represents the most authoritative 
statement of the law of state responsibility and that “there is no 
reason not to apply the rules therein to investment 
arbitration.”120 In particular, Articles 4, 5, and 8 of the ILC 
provide elements to identify the liability of the State and its 
instrumentalities that might be invoked through an umbrella 
clause.121 
Additionally, some argue that a mere breach of contract does 
not constitute a violation of international law.122 Thus, in order 
to deem a contract claim as an umbrella clause violation, the 
conduct must involve the exercise of sovereign power and be 
inconsistent with one of the state’s international obligations.123 
For example, if a state entity breaches its contractual obligation 
by using methods unavailable to a regular contracting party, or 
if the nonobservance of a contractual obligation constitutes a 
violation of the obligation to provide fair and equitable 
                                               
118. Feit, supra note 116, at 152–53. 
119. Id. at 151. 
120. Sébastien Manciaux, The Relationship Between States and Their 
Instrumentalities in Investment Arbitration, in STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 195, 210–11 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2008).The ILC articles have been 
applied by Arbitral Tribunals see. e.g. Noble v. Romania, Eureko v. Poland, and 
Mazeffini v. Spain. 
121. See Feit, supra note 116, at 151(“the basic difference between the principle of 
‘piercing the corporate veil’ and the rules of attribution as reflected in the ILC Articles, is 
that under the former, the contract itself is attributed to the state, while under the 
latter, only the act which constitutes the breach of international law is attributed for the 
purpose of state responsibility.”). 
122. See Feit, supra note 116, at 156. 
123. Id. 
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treatment of foreign investments, or whether it breaches its 
duty in exercise of its governmental authority.124 According to 
this approach, the arbitral tribunal in Pan Am. v. Argentina 
ruled that contract claims based on commitments made by the 
state as a sovereign give rise to a treaty claim.125 However, a 
different standard has also been applied by other Tribunals 
which have rejected the sovereign power requirement. In 
Burlington v. Ecuador, in a contract claim on the execution of an 
indemnity clause over tax changes, the Tribunal ruled that 
umbrella clauses may apply when a breach of contract is made 
and even if no exercise of sovereign power is involved.126 
Therefore, while attributing conduct to states is applied very 
broadly in international law, the interpretation of the umbrella 
clause has resulted in a number of contradictory awards.127 
Nevertheless, its implementation has been recognized in one 
way or another.128 This provision in itself may serve as a 
deterrent to unilateral changes in investment contracts, and 
even if it does not offer a panacea for contractual instability129 it 
is, however, a powerful agent for seeking enhanced 
compensation. 
iii.  Fiscal Stability through State Obligation of Treatment and 
Protection in BIT Standards 
As we could observe during the contract renegotiation period 
and by the imposition of the windfall profit tax since 2008, IOCs 
                                               
124. Id. at 161. 
125. Pan Am. Energy v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/13 (July 27, 2006). 
126. Burlington Resources v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, June 02, 2010 ¶190, quoting Duke Energy v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/19, Award, Aug. 18, 2008, ¶ 320–21. 
127. These clauses have been interpreted broadly, see, e.g., Noble v. Romania, 
supra note 106; and narrowly, see, e.g., SGS. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 170 (Aug. 6, 2003). Some tribunals have held 
that contractual breaches where the state acted as a sovereign will fall under the 
protection of the umbrella clause. see, e.g., El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Apr. 27, 2006). 
128. See, e.g., Duke v. Ecuador. Award,¶ 320, supra note 122. 
129. Nkiru Okobi, The Umbrella Clause: A Panacea for Contractual Instability? A 
Look at Production Sharing Contracts, CENTER FOR PETROLEUM AND MINERAL LAW 
POLICY 15 (2009). 
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have accepted tax increases in Venezuela when they are granted 
a profit margin. However, IOCs may be reluctant to accept any 
fiscal increase that would upset the economic balance of the 
investment and that may not be considered a mere amendment, 
but rather a state breach of the investment contract.130 In the 
absence of a stabilization clause in the MC contract, BIT 
provisions may provide oil companies some minimum standards 
according to the scope of the dispute resolution provision, the 
arbitrability of tax matters, and the alleged state breach of one 
of its commitments under a BIT. Two BIT commitments are 
then likely to be violated by changes in the fiscal regime: 1) the 
obligation to treat investors from the other state party by BIT 
standards, and 2) the obligation to protect, which includes the 
obligation not to expropriate their investments without 
compensation. In the first case, the investor should argue that a 
change in the fiscal legislation is contrary to the state obligation 
under the Most Favorable Nation Treatment (MFN) or the 
National Treatment (NT) provisions, when discriminatory, or by 
proving that a fiscal reform constituted tax harassment to the 
foreign investor violating fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
standards and rendering it uncompetitive relative to other 
investors.131 In Occidental v. Ecuador, a case concerning the 
contractual interpretation of valued-added tax (VAT) refunds, 
the arbitral tribunal ruled that “the Ecuadorian authorities 
wrongly interpreted the contract” and “the tax law was changed 
without providing any clarity about its meaning and extent, and 
the practice and regulations were also inconsistent with such 
changes.”132 Thus, the tribunal concluded that Ecuador 
breached its obligation to accord FET and NT treatment to the 
                                               
130. Sébastien Manciaux, Changement de législation fiscale et arbitrage 
international, in Revue de l’Arbitrage 311, 337 (2001). 
131. Id. However, Professor Manciaux explained that this argument would be 
limited by the scope of the BITs, which in some cases excludes tax matters. Id. Moreover, 
any case involving MFN standard treatment will require a case-by-case study on the 
recognition of the host state’s right to policy space and the analysis of “like 
circumstances.” Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award at ¶ 369 
(Sept. 11, 2007). 
132. Occidental v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Final Award ¶ 184 (U.S.-
Ecuador BIT) (July 1, 2004). 
2011] REBALANCING OIL CONTRACTS IN VENEZUELA 263 
investor in violation of the US- Ecuador BIT and Occidental was 
entitled of reimbursement.133 
Concerning the BIT commitment of protection, the investor 
should prove expropriation by way of a tax measure. The 
expropriation through taxation would involve an abuse of right 
with a confiscatory character.134 This requires that the tax 
measure deprive the investor of any return on investment or 
rendered the expectation of profits to a long-term time frame, 
undermining the economic function of its investment.135 The 
Arbitral Tribunal in EnCana v. Ecuador, also concerning the 
interpretation of VAT refunds, declined its jurisdiction on the 
ground that the Canada-Ecuador BIT did not provide protection 
over tax claims unless they constituted an expropriation.136 
Thus, the Tribunal placed taxation in a special category for 
purposes of a claim of expropriation, i.e., “only if a tax law is 
extraordinary, punitive in amount or arbitrary in its incidence 
would issues of indirect expropriation be raised.”137 Despite this 
interpretation open the possibility of an expropriation test, close 
attention must be given to the scope of BIT exceptions on tax 
matters.138 In Burlington v. Ecuador, in a claim involving the 
expropriation of contract rights and the application of a windfall 
                                               
133. Id. at ¶ 200. 
134. Manciaux, Id. 
135. Id. 
136. EnCana v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3481, Award ¶ 149 (Feb. 3, 2006), 45 
I.L.M. 901, 928 (2006). 
137. Id. at ¶ 177, 45 I.L.M. 901, 923. In a Dissenting opinion on this case the 
Arbitrator Horacio A. Griega Naón asserted that:  “A measure or series of measures do 
not need to totally eliminate returns to be expropriatory. A substantial or significant 
deprivation of returns suffices. (…) because requiring the total or quasi-total suppression 
of returns for an expropriation of returns to exist would be tantamount to requiring the 
existence of a de facto expropriation of the underlying investment, enjoying independent 
protection under the Treaty.” The argument was also used in CJSC Companies v. 
Mongolia, in a case involving the implementation of a Windfall Profit Tax against a gold 
mining investor. The Arbitral Tribunal concluded that “the expert evidence submitted by 
the Claimants does not support their thesis that the WPT constituted an expropriation 
measure or a measure tantamount to expropriation.” CJC Co. v. Mongolia, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, April 28, 2011, at ¶ 11.  
138. Mark Friedman, et al., International Arbitration, 41 INT’L LAW. 251, 272 
(2007) (“Several BITs exclude taxation measures from the scope of the BIT, but they 
often provide for exceptions when the tax measures amount to violations of certain BIT 
protections.”). 
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profit tax, the Tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction over 
expropriation claims but declined jurisdiction over 
non-expropriation claims relating to “matters of taxation”, on 
the ground that they were outside the scope of the US-Ecuador 
BIT.139 Hence, BIT provisions are currently being interpreted on 
their effectiveness to cover tax matters issues, producing an 
evolution of sources of stability in investment contracts, even 
more relevant when stability clauses have been excluded from 
the contract. 
b. The Restrictions on Access to International Arbitration and 
the Governing Law 
Removing investors’ access to international arbitration was 
a non-negotiable condition imposed by the Venezuelan 
government during the contract renegotiation between 2005 and 
2007.140 At that time IOCs assigned a greater value to future 
investment opportunities than to ensuring “neutral fairness” 
through the resort to international arbitration.141 The 
Venezuelan government argued oil contracts are matters of 
public utility and social interest that shall be submitted to 
Venezuelan law and Venezuelan tribunals,142 and imposes the 
following clause to all the contractors: 
                                               
139. Burlington v. Ecuador, supra note 126. 
140. Mommer Interview, supra note 59. “From the first day of negotiations we 
stated this [arbitration clause] right here will disappear.’ We did not discuss the issue. In 
other words, we began negotiating with well[-]defined political positions. Sovereignty 
will not be discussed or negotiated here. Numbers will.” Id. 
141. Witten, supra note 29, at 58. 
142. According to Article 9 of the OHL, the state assumed control over primary 
activities such as exploration, extraction, gathering, initial transportation and storage of 
hydrocarbons and the government defined agreements on these activities as contracts of 
public interest, which should remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Venezuelan 
courts. This policy is supported by Article 4 OHL and Article 151 of the Venezuelan 
Constitution (the Calvo clause), which sets forth that disputes relating to public interest 
contracts shall be decided by the competent courts of the Republic. Nevertheless, the 
same Article provides an exception to the submission of a dispute to national jurisdiction 
when it is provided for by the terms of a contract. Concerning the exception, Eljuri and 
Tejera Pérez stated that they “interpret this to mean that the clause would not apply to a 
contract of a commercial nature.” 21st Century Transformation, supra note 13, at 493. 
Thus, in their views, the exception should apply to oil contracts “since most of these 
contracts are commercial and are entered into by PDVSA when conducting commercial 
activities.” Id. at 492. However, they also pointed out the restrictive views of the 
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Applicable law and jurisdiction 
This Contract shall be governed by and interpreted in 
accordance with the laws of the Republic and any 
dispute or controversy that may arise in connection 
with this Contract which cannot be resolved amicably 
by the Parties shall be submitted exclusively to the 
courts of the Republic having jurisdiction. Before 
initiating any litigation, the Parties shall in good faith 
and within the framework of the Organic Hydrocarbons 
Law explore the possibility of utilizing mechanisms to 
amicably resolve controversies of any nature that may 
arise, including for technical matters, the possible 
request of opinions of independent experts appointed by 
mutual agreement. It is understood that any important 
dispute, including, for example, disputes relating to the 
Business Plan, work programs, development plans and 
related budgets, shall be referred to the chief executives 
of the parties involved in the dispute, who shall meet to 
endeavor to resolve the differences. In case such dispute 
is not resolved within sixty (60) days following the 
meeting held for such purpose by the Parties, they shall 
inform the Minister of the relevant details of the 
dispute.143 
i. Limitations to Contractual Arbitration 
The Article states that Venezuelan domestic courts retain 
jurisdiction over disputes concerning the MC contract. The 
provision includes a multi-tier dispute resolution mechanism 
comprising negotiation periods and expert adjudication. 
However, contrary to oil industry standard practice, this Article 
eliminates the investor’s resort to international arbitration.144 
By implementing this measure, the government sought to 
reduce CVP (or PDVSA) exposure to international arbitration 
and to avoid the duplication of international procedures, as 
                                               
Venezuelan Supreme Court has in the PDVSA v. Intesa decision, which indicates that 
“the activities of PDVSA are of vital importance to the economic development of the 
country and that they are directly related to guaranteeing the quality of life of all 
Venezuelans.” Id. at 493. 
143. See MC Terms and Conditions, Applicable Law and Jurisdiction clause, supra 
note 16. 
144. See Tozzini Freire Advogados and Bain & Company, Relatório I – Regimes 
Jurídico-Regulatórios E Contratuais de E&P de petróleo (2009). 
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occurred in the case of ExxonMobil.145 Moreover, it seems that 
the government takes advantage of the narrow interpretation 
and dichotomy between contract claims and treaty claims in 
investment arbitration decisions, in the assumption that 
contract claims should fall in the jurisdiction of national courts, 
narrowing the resort to arbitration only to investment treaty 
claims.146 This has been confirmed by government officials. As 
pointed out by Bernard Mommer, even if the government has 
blocked access to contractual arbitration, more arbitration 
cases against Venezuela could arise based on BITs, “since they 
rely on a complex network of international treaties and laws.”147 
Thus, the government has also taken measures to reduce access 
to investment arbitration but some exceptions still remain. 
ii.  Limitations to International Investment Arbitration but 
BIT Planning Allowed 
The Venezuelan government has criticized ICSID 
arbitration and issued various threats of denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention,148 or the creation of an alternative dispute 
resolution center,149 but so far, none have been implemented. On 
                                               
145. Mommer Interview, supra note 59. The Venezuelan government sought to 
avoid the exposure of PDVSA to a final award or temporary injunctive relief, as occurred 
with the Mareva injunction against PDVSA in the ExxonMobil case, which affected a 
PDVSA-Cerro Negro bank account in early 2008 (the Mareva Injunction was revoked in 
March 2008). See Id. “What you cannot do is bring a lawsuit against PDVSA because the 
State did this or that. The State responds on its own. That means that what ExxonMobil 
is doing today won’t happen again.” Id. Mommer explained that, “by engaging in 
arbitration against PDVSA, which is a state-owned company, they are trying to seize the 
assets the company has in the United States and that belong to Venezuela, such as bank 
accounts or assets. That was precisely what the old PDVSA dId. It put itself in a 
deliberate position to be susceptible to damages in case lawsuits arose.” Id. He refers to 
the internationalization strategy implemented in the 1980s, when PDVSA transferred 
money and assets overseas by buying refineries in Germany, Curacao, and CITGO in the 
United States, which could be seized in the execution of an arbitral award. Id. 
146. See Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 
¶ 114 (July 3, 2002). 
147. Bernard Mommer, Vice Minister of Hydrocarbons, Plena Soberanía Petrolera, 
Conference Presentation at El otro lado del arbitraje internacional de inversiones in 
Caracas (July 9–10, 2009). 
148. Acuerdo sobre la Campaña de la Transnacional Exxon Mobil contra Petróleos 
de Venezuela, S.A., Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela, G.O. No. 38.869, 13 de febrero 
2008. 
149. Declaración de la VI Cumbre Extraordinaria del ALBA-TCP, 24 de junio de 
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the contrary, PDVSA has acknowledged as favorable some 
recent arbitral decisions in claims against Venezuela before the 
ICSID.150 
However, a series of events have occurred limiting access to 
international investment arbitration. On April 30, 2008, the 
Venezuelan government gave official notice of its intention to 
terminate the BIT between Venezuela and the Netherlands 
(Dutch BIT),151 because IOCs—notably ExxonMobil—had been 
abusing the Dutch BIT to obtain ICSID jurisdiction.152 Later, on 
October 28, 2008, the Venezuelan Supreme Court issued a 
landmark decision that developed a narrow interpretation of 
Article 22 of Venezuela’s Investment Law, pointing out that the 
Article does not contain state consent to ICSID 
arbitration.153 Government officials likely filed the request to 
weaken the position foreign investors pursuing ICSID 
arbitration against Venezuela using the Investment Law as a 
vehicle to obtain jurisdiction. 
However, on June 2010, a decision on jurisdiction from the 
contract renegotiation arbitration cases was realized providing 
relevant information on BIT protection. The ICSID Arbitral 
Tribunal in Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela ruled that: 1) 
rejected the claimant’s request to invoke ICSID jurisdiction 
under Article 22 of the Venezuelan Investment Law on the 
ground that the “ambiguous” text cannot contain an advanced 
consent to arbitration, and 2) concluded that claims arising prior 
to the establishment of Exxon Mobil as a Dutch corporation in 
                                               
2009, Maracay, Venezuela, available at http://www.alba-tcp.org/contenido/declaracion-
conjunta-vi-cumbre. 
150. See Press Release, PDVSA, Report on the Claim by Cemex Against the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on the Provisional Measures. (Apr. 14, 2010) available 
at http://www.pdvsa. com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/readmenuprinc.tpl.html 
&newsid_temas=54. 
151. Venezuela gives notice to terminate Netherlands’ BIT. IA Reporter, available 
at: http://www.practicallaw.com/9-381-7749?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=. By its own terms, 
however, the treaty remains in force for fifteen years after termination. Art. 14, 
Neth.-Venez., BIT Oct. 22, 1991. 
152.  According to Minister Ramirez, Exxon Mobil registered its assets in the 
Netherlands in 2006, seeking for BIT protection and brought its case against Venezuela 
before the ICSID in October 2007. Reuters, Venezuela says preliminary Exxon ruling 
favorable. June 11, 2010. 
153. Decisión Nº 1541 of the Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, 
17 de Octubre 2008. 
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2006 are not admissible.154 Hence, the tribunal ruled it had 
jurisdiction over future claims, following the incorporation of 
Exxon Mobil as a Dutch corporation and based on alleged 
breaches of the Dutch BIT as far as they relate to the dispute 
concerning the nationalization measures taken by the 
Venezuelan government, narrowing the scope of the case.155 The 
Arbitral Tribunal stated that the aim of restructuring the 
investment to reach the protection of a BIT was “perfectly 
legitimate as far as it concerned future disputes”.156 Thus, the 
tribunal developed a ratione temporis test for deciding whether 
treaty-shopping strategies are legitimate according to principles 
of international investment law, which involves the observation 
of good faith and the rejection of any attempt of abuse of 
right.157 
Concerning the recognition of forum-shopping practice in 
Venezuela, the above mentioned Venezuelan Supreme Court 
Decision of October 2008 has deemed this practice to be 
“perfectly lawful and legitimate as long as it is not used to 
undermine the principle of the parties’ good faith in order to 
achieve a benefit or advantage not protected by the applicable 
legislation, at the expense of the rights and interests of the other 
party, such as those undertaken ex post behavior to legal 
business or in connection with the emergence of the dispute or 
controversy”158 
                                               
154. Mobil Corp. v., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 206 
(June 10, 2010). 
155. Id. at ¶ 209. 
156. Id. at ¶ 204 
157. Mobil Decision is also based quoting the Phoenix Action on the standard of 
abuse of right, (Phoenix Action v. Rep Czech ICSID case No. ARB/06/5, Decision of 
Jurisdiction (2009)) and Aucoven v. Venezuela (ICSID Case No.ARB/00/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (2001) concerning the duty of notification of restructuring and good faith. 
The test is currently been tested in the case Tidewaters v. Venezuela (Procedural Order 
No. 1), supra note 50, and further attention shall be paid to the questions of the notion of 
investors and investment in BIT, in order to proceed with this practice. See also, Paul 
Michael Blyschak, Access and advantage expanded: Mobil Corporation v Venezuela and 
other recent arbitration awards on treaty shopping. J World Energy Law Bus 2011 4: 
32–39. 
158. MACLEOD DIXON, VENEZUELAN SUPREME TRIBUNAL ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL 
DECISION ON ARBITRATION (2008), http://www.macleoddixon.com/documents/ 
Bulletin__TSJ_issues_ fundamental_decision_on_arbitration__Oct__23_2008.pdf. 
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The research found that the Venezuelan authorities have 
followed this standard and investors have proceeded to treaty 
and forum shopping strategies at the onset of the project in 
subsequent MC contracts. For instance, Chevron and ENI have 
signed agreements as corporations incorporated in The 
Netherlands and have obtained protection under the Dutch BIT, 
which also provides access to ICSID arbitration.159 Similarly, 
Petrobras has entered in a MC Contract through an Argentinian 
subsidiary eligible for protection under the 
Venezuelan-Argentina BIT which includes an ICSID arbitration 
clause.160 Thus, the events confirm that Venezuela does not wish 
to depart from the investment arbitration forum. Further, the 
Venezuelan government recently signed three new BITs with 
the governments of Belarus, Russia, and Vietnam between 2008 
and 2009.161 These three BITs were executed in the framework 
of negotiations for new investments in the oil and gas 
industry.162 The BITs contain provisions for ad hoc arbitration 
under U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) rules and arbitration before the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce.163 Thus, arbitration remains an 
                                               
159.  See, e.g., MC Petropiar (CVP-Chevron) and MC Petrosucre (CVP-ENI) 
Official Gazette No. 38.844, January 7, 2008. 
160. See, e.g., Petrowayú, (CVP-Petrobras-Williams Int.), G.O. No. 38.518, 
September 8, 2006. It is interesting to observe how Petrobras is taking advantages of the 
practice of BIT treaty shopping which provide substantives investment protection rights, 
while the Brazilian Government refuse to ratify BITs entered with other countries to 
provide same treatment to foreign investors. 
161. Alfredo de Jesús O., Overview of Recent Developments in Investment 
Arbitration and the Oil and Gas Industry in Venezuela, IBA ARB. NEWS (Int’l Bar Ass’n, 
London), Sept. 2010, at 103–04; see also Ley Aprobatoria del Acuerdo Entre el Gobierno 
de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la Federación de Rusia sobre 
la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones, G.O. No. 39.191, 2 de junio de 2009 
(Venez.) [hereinafter Venezuela-Russia BIT]; Ley Aprobatoria del Acuerdo Entre el 
Gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la Rebpúlica 
Socialista de Vietnam para la Promoción y Protección de las Inversiones, , G.O. No. 
39.170, 4 de mayo de 2009 (Venez.) [hereinafter Venezuela-Vietnam BIT]; Ley 
Aprobatoria del Acuerdo Entre el Gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el 
Gobierno de la Rebpúlica Belarús sobre Promoción y Protección Recíproca de 
Inversiones, G.O. No. 38.894, 24 de marzo de 2008 (Venez.) [hereinafter Venezuela-
Belarus BIT]. 
162. Id., at 104. 
163. Id. These new agreements show that ICSID arbitration has been removed 
from the Venezuelan BIT practice. See Id. For example, even though Venezuela and 
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alternative method of dispute resolution in the oil sector in 
Venezuela, through BIT protection, which under certain 
conditions allows investors to employ treaty-planning strategies. 
iii.  Governing Law 
Large oil-producing countries like Venezuela insist on 
applying their national law to international petroleum 
agreements. The Applicable Law and Jurisdiction clause of the 
MC Contract states that the contract itself is “governed by and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Republic.”164 
Additionally, Article 1.9 of the MC Contract establishes that 
“the applicable laws shall prevail over petroleum industry 
practices.”165 This approach allows the government to regulate 
an investment in accordance with its national policy priorities, 
thereby increasing the legal risk of unilateral intervention.166 
Having proved that access to international arbitration has 
continued to be a practice in Venezuela, the role of international 
law remains essential.167 Dr. Yas Banifatemi explains that this 
role in no way undermines that of the law of the host State 
where it would be the proper law.168 The two systems of law may 
be applied depending on each distinct issue to be determined on 
the merits.169 Dr. Banifatemi finds support for this principle in 
three places: the second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID 
Convention,170 Article 33(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
                                               
Belarus are both parties to the ICSID Convention, but the Venezuela-Belarus BIT does 
not provide for ICSID arbitration. Id.; see Venezuela-Belarus BIT, supra note 161, art. 8 
(providing for UNCITRAL arbitration). 
164. See MC Terms and Conditions, supra note 16, art. 7. 
165. Id. art 1.9. 
166. Lauren Grau, Comment, Cutting Off the Building Blocks to Methamphetamine 
Production: A Global Solution to Methamphetamine Abuse, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 157, 186 
& n.184 (2007) (describing the difficulties of implementing U.S. anti-drug policies in 
Venezuela and North Korea and attributing those difficulties, in part, to “Venezuela’s 
thwarting of other U.S. policy goals in the region”). 
167. Yas Banifatemi, The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 191, (K. Yannaca-Small 
ed., 2010) [hereinafter The Law Applicable to Investment Treaty Arbitration]. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 204. 
170. ICSID Convention, at art. 42(1). 
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Rules171 and Article 22(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce,172 which enable arbitral 
tribunals, in the exercise of their discretion and pursuant to a 
choice of law inquiry, to decide what rule of law (international or 
domestic) is the most appropriate to the determination of each 
specific question.173 
For instance, Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides 
that “[t]he Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with 
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence 
of such an agreement, the tribunal shall apply the law of the 
contracting state party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.”174 A first reading of the Article may lead one to 
believe that international law has a subsidiary role in ICSID 
disputes.175 However, modern practice in arbitration provides 
that national law may be supplemented by international 
practice and international law principles to ensure international 
law customs apply when they conflict with the applicable 
domestic law.176 Hence, foreign investors covered by a BIT could 
have protection in aspects such as the state’s bona fide 
commitments and legitimate expectations through alternatives 
sources in addition to the Venezuelan Law, under the general 
principles of international law or the lex mercatoria.177 
                                               
171. UNCITRAL Rules 12–May 7, 1976. See also, art. 35 of the UNCITRAL Rules, 
15, August, 2010. 
172. Arbitration Inst., Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules art. 
22(1) (2010) 
173. The Law Applicable to Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra note 167 at 200–
01. 
174. ICSID Convention, at art. 42(1). 
175. Tudor, supra note 114, at 11. 
176. See Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “and” in Article 
42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in 
the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REV. 375, 407 (2003) (quoting Amco Asia 
Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Ad hoc Committee Decision on the 
Application for Annulment, ¶ 20 (May 16, 1986). 
177. See Laura Henry, Investment Agreement Claims under the 2004 Model U.S. 
BIT: A Challenge for State Police Powers?, 31 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 935, 975 (2010). See also 
Carmen Otero, Consideraciones sobre la Ley applicable a los Contratos Petrolíferos 
Internacionales, Rivisa di Diritto Internazionale Privado e Processuale, Anno XLV-N.2, 
Aprile-Giunio 2009, pp. 351–386. 
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The Calvo doctrine measures implemented in Venezuela 
have reduced investors’ rights toward contractual disputes, also 
affecting the predictability of investments in the oil sector.178 
However, BITs contradict the two keys tenets of the Calvo 
doctrine: 1) the exclusive application of the state’s law and 2) the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the state’s courts.179 Despite that, the 
Venezuelan government has become more sophisticated by using 
national law and coercive state power to the detriment of foreign 
private investors,180 pragmatic decisions have been made 
providing different sources of protection to foreign investors. 
Identifying these pragmatic decisions contributes to the 
understanding on how the current legal framework was accepted 
by IOCs after the contract renegotiation over existing 
operations. However, imposing this nationalistic regime on new 
projects represents a great challenge for the Venezuelan 
government.181. Therefore, the government should 
assess the flexibility of the legal regime to make the necessary 
adjustments. 
III. METHODS OF AWARDING CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF 
BALANCE IN THE VENEZUELAN’S PETROLEUM CONTRACT 
REGIME FOR ORINOCO BELT PROJECTS 
[L]e réquilibrage du droit des investissements ne doit 
pas affaiblir la protection légitime des droits des 
investisseurs. Tout investisseur privé qui réalise des 
investissements à l’étranger a des aspirations légitimes à 
la justice et à l’égalité.182 
 
Oil prices dramatically fell at the end of 2008, gradually 
affecting the Venezuelan economy.183 As a result, the 
Venezuelan government lacked the resources to undertake the 
$119 billion investment plan needed to boost oil production to 
more than 5 million barrels a day, according to the ”Siembra 
                                               
178. Calvo Redivivus, supra note 98. 
179. Id. 
180. Political Risk Management, supra note 44, at 28. 
181. Tozzini Freire Advogados and Bain & Company, supra note 144, at 444. 
182. BEN HAMIDA, supra note 10, at 21. 
183. Venezuela Oil: Another Asset Grab, THE ECONOMIST, May 12, 2009. 
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Petrolera” Plan 2009–2013.184 The new scenario has led the 
government to move from a decade of reforms reaffirming its 
sovereignty over hydrocarbons into a new era of negotiation in 
which foreign investors are seeking better conditions to secure 
their investments. 
The simultaneous implementation of different methods of 
awarding contracts has led the Venezuelan government to seek 
a balanced approach by creating incentives adapted to the 
current scenario. Article 37 of the OHL establishes two methods 
of awarding contracts for an MC. First, the licensing round 
method is defined in the first part of the Article, where “[t]he 
competent public body shall promote the existence of various 
offers for the selection of the operators.”185 In February 2010, 
the auction of blocks of the Carabobo Area in the Orinoco Belt 
awarded two out of three projects to international consortiums 
associated with CVP after a long and complex process 
characterized by delays and changing contractual 
conditions.186 Second, the same article establishes that “[f]or 
reasons of public interest or for special circumstances related to 
the activities, the operators may be directly selected, with the 
prior approval of the Council of Ministers.”187 Thus, the 
Venezuelan petro-diplomacy has led to direct negotiations that 
awarded oil blocks to political partners.188 
In a study on the recognition of State and foreign investor’s 
interest under international investment law, Dr. Walid Ben 
Hamida has noted two distinct sources that shape and protect 
these interests.189 The first source is contractual in nature: BITs 
and investment contracts enumerate and describe in detail the 
interests held by both parties.190 The second source is the 
precedent set by international arbitration decisions, which 
provides nuanced solutions to investment disputes and 
                                               
184. CONAPRI, BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES: PETROLEUM, http://www.conapri.org/ 
English/MainCategory.asp?categoryid=. 
185. See OHL, supra note 19, art. 37. 
186. Venezuela Awards 2 Blocks in Massive Oil Region, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB., 
Feb. 11, 2010. 
187. See OHL, supra note 19, art. 37. 
188. See Help Needed to Make Orinoco Flow, supra note 8. 
189. See BEN HAMIDA, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
190. See Id. 
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interpretations of relevant contractual and legal provisions.191 
The international oil sector has produced relevant decisions on 
expropriation, stabilization provisions, access to arbitration, and 
the recognition of state responsibility to foreign investors.192 
These approaches are currently being tested by the recent 
increase of international litigation resulting from the resurgence 
of nationalization in oil-producing countries.193 Events in the 
next few years will determine whether these approaches must 
be adapted to new situations.194 
Meanwhile, the following Section evaluates the recent 
international agreements entered into by the Venezuelan 
government with oil producing companies in the adjudication of 
two main Areas of the Orinoco Belt: the Carabobo Area and the 
Junín Area. 
                                               
191. Id. at 7. 
192. See generally R.D. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF PETROLEUM 
DISPUTES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEX PETROLEA (1998). 
193. Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed 
Nationalization, Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International 
Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 359, 376, 381–82 (2008). 
194. Id. 
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A. The Tender of the Carabobo Area 
One year after implementing the nationalization process, 
the Venezuelan government launched the tender for the 
Carabobo project in October 2008.195 Carabobo is one of the most 
important hydrocarbon projects in the Western hemisphere. The 
amount of oil reserves auctioned reached 127.6 billion barrels of 
heavy oil, a potential production of 1.2 million barrels/day and a 
required investment between $10–$20 billion dollars per project, 
which includes construction of heavy oil upgraders.196 Nineteen 
oil-producing companies participated in the tender and sought to 
enter or increase their investment in the Venezuelan oil 
sector.197 The selection of the winning bidders was based on a 
                                               
195. See https://fajadelorinoco.com/. 
196. Factbox, Venezuela Development Plan for Orinoco Oil Belt, REUTERS, Apr. 2, 
2010. The 7 blocks were auctioned in three groups. Id. 
197. The participant companies were BP, Chevron, CNPC, Ecopetrol, ENI, Galp 
Energía, Inpex Corporation, Japan Oil Gas Metals, Mitsubishi Corporation, Ongc Videsh 
Limited, Petrobras, Petronas, Repsol, Shell, Sinopec, StatoilHydro, Suelopetrol, Total, 
and a National Consortium of Russian Companies. Only Ecopetrol cancelled its 
participation due to the ongoing diplomatic conflict between Venezuela and Colombia 
caused by the establishment of U.S. military bases in Colombia in 2009. A $2 million 
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formula combining the amount of the signing bonus, a 
marketing proposal for the heavy crude oil produced, and a 
funding proposal to reduce the financial burden of PDVSA. As 
oil prices recovered in 2009, PDVSA took an aggressive position, 
seeking a minimum of $2.5 billion signing bonus and $3 billion 
of loan guarantees for the PDVSA investment.198 
Nevertheless, in addition to the difficulties posed by the 
global economic crisis in 2009, the Venezuelan authorities also 
suffered from the inflexibility of the bidding conditions, which 
delayed the allocation process.199 Although three models 
of conditions were presented during 2009, the first two models 
were tacitly rejected by the participants in the tender when no 
offers were made.200 Consequently, the government approved a 
third model, which included a number of incentives to attract 
the participation of foreign investors.201 An overview of the 





















1. Bonus Amount payable to 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
Project Carabobo 1: $1 Billion 
Project Carabobo 2: $1 Billion 
Project Carabobo 3: $500 millions 
2. Funding proposal for the Joint Venture which could 
reduce the financial burden of PDVSA in the projects. 
3. Marketing proposal for the entire Crude oil 
processed by the Joint Venture. 
                                               
bonus for the data room of the Carabobo project was required. Id. 
198. Aplazan otra Vez, supra note 5. 
199. Id. 
200. See infra Part III.A.1. 
201. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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4. Recovery factor of 20%. 
Blocks 
Offered 
The first proposal 
offers 2 projects 
each with two 
blocks and requires 
the construction of 
2 oil upgraders. 
The second proposal 
expanded its offer 
to 3 projects, two of 
two blocks and a 
third of 3 blocks, 
requiring the 







and the jurisdiction 
of the Venezuelan 
courts. 
Venezuelan 
Law and the 
jurisdiction of the 
Venezuelan courts. 
The government 
agreed to accept an 
arbitration clause 
on claims relating 
to their financial 
burden. Annex 1 to 
the Loan 
Agreement includes 
an ICC arbitration 












-33.33% Of Royalty 
(30% royalty of 
3.33% more special 
advantages). 
-50% Income Tax. 
-Special 
Contribution Tax on 
Extraordinary Price 
of Oil (deductible in 
calculating Income 
Tax) 
-33.33% Of Royalty 
(30% royalty over 











from 30% to 
20% according 
to article 44 of 
the OHL. 
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Operator PDVSA as the 
operator of the 
Project. 
Offers to give the 
role of Operator to 
the IOC for the 
construction period 
of the upgraders, 
then to grants the 
role of Operator to 
PDVSA at the 
beginning of oil 
production. 
 
1. The Inflexibility of the Original Contractual Conditions 
The Venezuelan government argued that the auction delays 
occurred because “the companies have asked for more time to 
form their consortiums.”202 Some experts indicated that 
“a project of such magnitude was impossible to negotiate in 
the schedules that the government had issued.” For others, “the 
economic conditions and the exclusion of arbitration within the 
contract limited the presentation of bids.” Finally, the research 
found that investors unanimously agreed that “[t]he numbers do 
not add up.” The research identified the following four elements 
of inflexibility in the tender package: 1) fiscal regime, 2) 
technical factors, 3) operating factors, and 4) the exclusion of 
arbitration clauses in contracts for primary activities. 
a. Fiscal Regime 
PDVSA demanded a substantial amount of financial 
investment from foreign companies. This demand was a major 
stumbling block in the negotiations for the Carabobo Project, 
since companies were required to secure financing not just for 
their own stakes (40%), but also to reduce PDVSA’s 
financial burden.203 In practice, this condition required 
companies to undertake 100% of project financing. According to 
an economic study on the Venezuelan hydrocarbons fiscal 
regime by Tozzini Freire Advogados and Bain & Company, the 
combined fiscal burden of a 50% tax rate on profits, 33.33% on 
royalties, 1% tax for social programs, the “shadow tax,” and the 
                                               
202. Aplazan otra vez, supra note 4. 
203. Id. 
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Law of Special Contribution, could reach a to 90% of 





The same study examined the exploitation of large project 
using different pricing scenarios for the MC model under the 
Venezuelan tax system. The study concluded that the internal 
rate of return for private investors will not be positive in a 
scenario of $25/barrel. The recovery period would be twelve 
years when oil was at $50/barrel. Thus, the long-term recovery 
period is detrimental to international oil companies and could 
discourage private investment in Venezuela.205 In fact, during 
the first quarter of 2009, the average price for the Venezuelan 
crude basket was $47.33 per barrel.206 However, if oil prices 
reach the range of $60 to $80, investment in the Orinoco oil 
                                               
204. Tozzini Freire Advogados and Bain & Company, supra note 144, at 439. The 
shadow tax is triggered in case the fiscal take does not reach at least 50% of gross profits 
after applying royalties, taxes and other levies. Thus, the MC must pay the difference 
between this threshold and the fiscal take. Id. 
205. Id. at 438–446. 
206. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, WEEKLY VENEZUELA TIA 
JUANA LIGHT SPOT PRICE FOB, http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx? 
n=PET&s= WEPCVETIA&f=W (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
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could significantly reduce the period of investment recovery, as 
illustrate the following figure:207 
 
 
b.  Technical factors 
The government has demanded a rate of recovery factor of 
20% through thermal recovery techniques.208 According to one 
manager interviewed, “the rate of recovery of 20% has 
been imposed by the Venezuelan government without adhering 
to the current reality of crude oil produced on the Orinoco Belt, 
whose recuperation rates are around 8%, and between 12% and 
14%, under gas injection.”209 This requirement demands 
a higher level of investment, which increases the project’s costs. 
However Del Pino, supporting the PDVSA position, declared in 
November 2009 that PDVSA estimates “20% as a conservative 
figure” due to the development of more efficient oil recovery 
technologies in the future.210 
                                               
207. Tozzini Freire Advogados and Bain & Company, supra note 144, at 438–46. It 
is worth noting that the graphics based on offshore scenarios through two ranges of 
prices have been developed as equivalent to onshore projects in the Orinoco Belt. The 
study shows the cash flow behavior in cases of high level of investment such as the 
production of heavy crude oil or offshore deep waters oil wells. Id. 
208. Miguel Romero, Intevep Busca Producir Technología que Permita Mayor 
Factor de Recobro, CORREO DEL ORINOCO, Nov. 6, 2009, at 9. 
209. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (July. 29, 2009). 
210. Id. 
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c. Operating Factors  
Despite undertaking heavy financing costs, the 
international companies will not have operational control over 
their investments. While delivering the second package of 
conditions, the government made a significant proposal. This 
proposal indicated that while the upgraders were being 
constructed, the international companies would retain 
operational control over the project. This could be achieved 
through the incorporation of an additional company dedicated 
exclusively to infrastructure building where the foreign 
investors could have control of the project. This proposal would 
require, however, that the international companies perform all 
the initial infrastructure work, only to hand over control of the 
project to CVP in the capital recovery phase. 
d. The Exclusion of Arbitration in Contracts of Primary 
Activities 
The Carabobo Project requires investments between $10–
$20 billion dollars per project, including at least $6 billion for 
the construction of upgrading facilities of 400,000 barrels of 
heavy crude per project.211 Thus, given the significant amounts 
of investments in infrastructure, access to international 
arbitration became a critical aspect of the negotiations. 
Although the risk of expropriation tends to decrease when new 
investments are required, the state’s previous nationalization of 
private industries contributes to uncertainty about the risk of 
expropriation. 
       The Position of IOCs 
Representatives of the IOCs indicated that they sought to 
include arbitration protection in the contract.212 Nevertheless, 
the request was publicly rejected in early 2009 by Minister 
Ramirez and Deputy Ángel Rodríguez, former President of the 
Parliament Commission of Energy.213 Those who have found 
                                               
211. Auction of Venezuela’s Vast Carabobo Oil Fields, supra note 3. 
212. Venezuela Not to Accept Arbitration in Carabobo Block of Orinoco Belt, EL 
UNIVERSAL (Venez.), Apr. 28, 2009. 
213. Id. 
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protection in BITs declared that BITs represent an alternative 
method to gain access to international arbitration.214 
       The Position of NOCs 
The recent BITs approved by Venezuela with the 
governments of Belarus, Vietnam, and Russia, show that even 
political partners sought to grant international arbitration and 
substantive investment protection rights to their NOCs, acting 
as any other IOCs in the international oil market on this issue. 
2.  The Incentives Granted and the Auction Results 
Was the approval of incentives a predictable outcome? The 
answer is probably yes. The different oil shocks exposed the 
pendulum swing between protectionism and liberalization in the 
energy sector, giving investors a better understanding of 
investment cycles.215 But before announcing the shift in the 
government’s position, the Venezuelan authorities allowed a 
lengthy process marked by auction delays.216 In August 2009, 
during an interview with a CVP manager, a question was raised 
about the possibility that negotiations could be halted because of 
the conditions imposed by the Venezuelan government; the 
laconic answer was that, “the authorities will take the necessary 
measures.”217  
On October 1, 2009, Minister Ramírez announced 
that the Venezuelan government was reviewing the fiscal 
conditions for the winners of the Carabobo tender, in order to 
stimulate the companies to invest in Venezuela despite the 
                                               
214. Jean Carlos Manzano, Francia y Venezuela acuerdan términos para explotar 
la Faja, EL MUNDO, ECONOMÍA & NEGOCIOS (Venez.), Sept. 10, 2009, at 14. Pierre-
Franck Chevet, Director General of the French Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustained 
Development and the Sea addressed arbitration concerns by noting that, “[t]here is a 
bilateral investment treaty signed in 2004 between both states, for us this is enough, 
considering that it was signed by the president Chávez.” Id. 
215. Thomas Friedman, The First Law of Petropolitics, FOREIGN POLICY, May/June 
2006. 
216. Deisy Butrago, Prevalecerá Esquema Fiscal en la Faja Pese a la Crisis, EL 
UNIVERSAL, Apr. 20, 2009. 
217. Personal interview, in Caracas, Venez. (July. 30, 2009). 
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global recession.218 According to an official press release issued 
by the MPPEP, the Minister announced the possibility 
of ”applying mechanisms of the OHL to reduce taxes 
and royalties to grant the economic feasibility of the project.”219 
Also, Minister Ramírez indicated the possibility of two types of 
fiscal regimes: the traditional one that taxes company profits at 
50% and a special one that lowers the tax rate to 34% if the 
company built the refinery.220 These announcements were in 
accord with Articles 44 and 48 of the OHL and would allow a 
new economic balance in future ventures in the Orinoco Belt.221 
In this way, Article 44 of the OHL sets out the possibility of 
reducing the royalty income from 30% to 20% to ensure the 
economic viability of the projects.222 Similarly, Article 48.4 of the 
OHL offers the possibility of reducing the extraction tax from 
1/3% to 20%, and Article 48.5 OHL offers the possibility 
of partially or totally eliminating the so-called general 
consumption tax.223 Moreover, November 12, 2009 was set as 
the deadline to deliver the final conditions package, January 28, 
2010 as the deadline for the receipt of bids, and February 8, 
2010 as the date for announcing the winners. 224 
On January 28, 2010, two consortia presented offers for two 
of the three auctioned projects. One consortium, led by Repsol 
and including Malasya’s Pretronas and India’s ONCC, placed a 
bid for the Carabobo 1 Project.225 A second consortium led by 
                                               
218. Venezuela studies for the first time from 1999 to reduce oil taxes, AFP, Oct. 1, 
2009. 
219. Press Release, Ministry for Energy and Petroleum, Acuerdan Cronograma 
para la Selección de Socios en el Area Carabobo (Oct. 1, 2009) available at 
http://www.mem.gov.ve/portal menpet/noticias.php?option=view&idNot=1453 
[hereinafter “Petroleum Ministry Press Release”]. 
220. Venezuela Ofrece Incentivos Fiscales a Petroleras que Construyan Refinerías, 
EFE, Sept. 22, 2009, available at http://informe21.com/venezuala/venezuela-ofrece-
incentivios-fiscales-petroleras-construyan-refinerias. 
221. Petroleum Ministry Press Release, supra note 219. 
222. Id. 
223. See OHL, supra note 19, art. 48. 
224. Petroleum Ministry Press Release, supra note 219. 
225. See Venezuela Awards Two Carabobo Licenses, OILVOICE, Feb. 15, 2010, 
http://www.oilvoice.com/n/Venezuela_Awards_Two_Carabobo_Licenses/2f74b785f.aspx. 
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Chevron and including Mitsubishi, JOGMEC, Inpex, and 
Suelopetrol, placed a bid for the Carabobo 3 Project.226 
Surprisingly, no offer was received for Carabobo 2. Companies 
such as Shell, Statoil, Total, CNPC, and a consortium of Russian 
Companies declined to participate despite their prior 
announcements in 2009.227 
a. The Carabobo Auction Results 
On February 10, 2010, the Venezuelan government awarded 
two projects: Carabobo 1 to Repsol and Carabobo 3 to 
Chevron.228 The final incentives were announced for the MC 
participating in projects in the Orinoco Belt as follows: 
b. Economic Incentives 
1) The payment of the signature bonus will be divided into 
two or three payments: $1 billion signature bonus for Carabobo 
1 and $500 million signature bonus for Carabobo 3.229 2) 
Reduced rates of royalties and taxes according to Articles 44 and 
48 of the OHL, which will enable companies to recover their 
investments in a period equal to or shorter than seven years 
from the start of commercial production of upgraded crude oil.230 
3) Early production of non-upgraded crude in the third year of 
the project in order to allow companies to have access to cash 
flow for the construction of the upgraders.231 These three major 
changes approved by the government are the first economic 
incentives offered to foreign investors in the Venezuelan oil 
                                               
226. See Id. 
227. Total, CNPC to Bid on Venezuela Oil Blocks, REUTERS, July 4, 2009. 
228. Steven Bodzin, Daniel Cancel, and Jose Orozco, Chevron, Repson Win $30 
Billion Venezuela Oil Auction (Update 2), BLOOMBERG, Feb. 11, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTJwEEbT9BI0. 
229. Carlos Bellorin, The Petroleum Royalty Reduction in Venezuela, THE ENERGY 
LAW ADVISOR, available at http://www.cailaw.org/iel_advisor/industry_news/ 
petroy_venezuela.html. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. Moreover, the provision establishes that in case the Ministry chooses to 
reduce the royalty rate and the extraction tax, the “shadow tax” will be subject to an 
“adjustment in order to ensure that it does not neutralize, in whole or in part, such 
reductions.” Id. 
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industry since Hugo Chávez began his tenure in government. 232 
However, their implementation shall be reviewed in light of the 
new regulations and waivers of the 2011 windfall profit tax 
reform. 
c. International Arbitration 
Concerning access to international arbitration, both Repsol 
and Chevron have found BIT protection and access to 
international arbitration. Repsol, under the Venezuelan-Spain 
BIT and Chevron through a subsidiary incorporated in 
Denmark, based on the Venezuela-Denmark BIT.233 Both BITs 
provide state consent to ICSID arbitration or ad hoc arbitration 
under UNCITRAL rules. Thus, in the case of Chevron, it is 
worth concluding that the Venezuelan government confirms its 
consent to the treaty-planning strategy by foreign investors in 
the onset of the project. This also demonstrates the 
government’s pragmatic decisions toward international 
investment protection rights granted to foreign investors, 
including international arbitration to ensure the required 
investments in the country. 
The government’s shifting position regarding the fiscal 
regime has permitted the participation of a diverse range of 
foreign investors in two mega projects. The Carabobo auction 
allowed competition between oil companies to emerge when 
their adaptability to the current conditions was challenged.234 It 
also shows the new strategy to organize consortia between 
NOCs and IOCs. In these consortia, the NOCs provide political 
cover and capital, and the IOCs offer technical expertise, 
creating a scenario of cooperation and a new pattern of behavior 
for international oil companies. Although, potential partners to 
the Carabobo 2 Project declined to participate, the Ministry of 
Energy announced that three new offers were made in April 
                                               
232. Id. 
233. See Carabobo Bid Results published at the Gaceta Oficial No. 39.421, May 11, 
2010, at 376 .440. See also, Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, Denmark-Venez., Nov. 28, 1994. 
234. See, U.S. Embassy in Caracas Cable 10CARACAS193. Chevron “Wins” A 
Carabobo Project. Feb. 10, 2010. Available at: http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/02/ 
10CARACAS193.html 
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2010 for this project; however, so far no new announcement has 
been made.235 
B.  The Practice of Direct Negotiation of the Junín Area Blocks 
According to an official press release of the MPPEP on 
October 1, 2009, Minister Ramírez guaranteed that the 
conditions of the project of the Carabobo block “will be compared 
with those established in the agreement signed with Russia” in 
the Junín block 6 and similar projects with China and 
Vietnam.236 What is the scope of this declaration? The 
Venezuelan government started negotiations with different 
companies from countries with whom it maintains strategic 
alliances, such as Russia, China, Spain, France, 
Vietnam, and India. 
These agreements concern the adjudication of five Junín 
Area zones with great potential of reserves in the Orinoco 
belt such as: Junín 2 North (Petrovietnam), Junín 4 (CNPC), 
Junín 5 (ENI), Junín 7 (Repsol YPF), and Junín 10 (TOTAL and 
StatoilHydro), where the total investments announced have 
ranged between $16 billion and $25 billion each.237  
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Source: Reuters, Upstream online, and PDVSA. 
 
The projects operated by PDVSA are ambitiously designed 
to begin producing by 2013 and contain a total investment of $80 
billion.238 Several upgrades to transform heavy oil into lighter 
synthetic oil will become operational several years later.239 
Nevertheless, despite the grandiose initial announcements, 
several of these proposed assignments remain uncertain and 
further negotiations are needed to define the founding terms of 
MCs. For instance, according to statements by Minister 
Ramírez, relating to the block Junín 10, “[t]he proposals 
presented by the companies Statoil and Total did not meet the 
required conditions”, suspending negotiations on this project.240 
The practice of directly negotiating with NOCs from 
geopolitical allies has created new international instruments 
that have been more effective in the design of incentive 
mechanisms. The close political and military ties between the 
governments of Venezuela and Russia,241 and the strategic 
political alliance between Venezuela and Vietnam,242 have 
provided the backdrop for the approval of incentives for the 
development of the Junín 6 Block by a Russian National 
Petroleum Consortium (NPC)243 and the Junín 2 block by 
Petrovietnam. 
                                               
238. Id. 
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240. Descartan Participación De Total Y Statoil En Bloque Petrolero De Junín 10, 
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1. Incentive Mechanisms Granted through Direct 
Negotiation 
Negotiations with the Russian and Vietnamese 
governments produced several bilateral agreements and 
investment packages244 with interesting provisions to govern 
different areas of the contractual relation. 
a.  Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance in the Venezuela-Russia Energy 
Cooperation Treaty is similar to that granted to investors in 
other Orinoco Belt projects. 
Article 3: (. . .) The decisions of the shareholders that 
involve significant changes to the Mixed Company with 
respect to the structure and/or effectiveness of the 
business, including, among others, the Business Plan 
and budget will be taken by qualified majority voting 
and other decisions are taken by simple majority of its 
members.245  
The article gives the foreign investor greater control over 
the approval of the project’s Business Plan and Annual Budget 
through the vote of qualified majority. This provision was later 
incorporated into the Bylaws of the Mixed Company 
Petromiranda (CVP-NPC) created for the development of the 
block Junín 6.246 
b.  Fiscal Adjusting Mechanism 
One of the most innovative pieces of the agreement is found 
in Article 4 of Annex 1 of the Venezuela-Russia Cooperation 
Agreement for the Development of Specific Projects (Block Junín 
6). 247 It incorporates an economic-balancing clause that will 
                                               
244. Important examples are: The Venezuela-Russia Energy Cooperation 
Agreement, G.O. No. 39.312, 23 de noviembre 2009 (Venez.) [hereinafter Venezuela-
Russia Energy Cooperation Agreement] and the Venezuela-Russia Cooperation 
Agreement for the Development of Specific Projects G.O. No. 39.312, 23 de noviembre de 
2009 [hereinafter Venezuela-Russia Agreement on Specific Projects]. 
245. Venezuela-Russia Energy Cooperation Agreement, supra note 244, art. 3. 
246. Art. 16. II. MC Petromiranda Bylaws. G.O. No. 39.455, 29 de Junio de 2010. 
247. Venez. Russia Agreement on Specific Projects, at annex 1, art. 4, supra note 
244. 
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serve as a pendulum whenever the estimated cost shows that 
the investment cannot be recovered within seven years after the 
start of commercial production of upgraded crude oil. In that 
situation, the Venezuelan government shall approve fiscal 
incentives to guarantee the project’s financial feasibility.248 In 
its entirety, Article 4, titled Basic Investment Terms and 
Conditions, provides: 
The project economy calculated on the basis of Class 5 
estimated cost so far indicates that the proposed 
extra-heavy oil exploitation of the Block Junín 6 in the 
Orinoco Oil belt, may require to be economically 
exploitable, the granting of tax incentives, hence, the 
Parties agree to instruct to their respective companies, 
CNP, by the Russian side and CVP, by the Venezuela 
side, to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding for 
the incorporation of a Mixed Company based on the 
following economic consideration: 
 
a) The activities of the Mixed Company will aim to 
achieve an Internal Rate of Return equal to or 
greater than 19% which would allow an investment 
recovery timeframe equal to or less than 7 years 
counted from the start of the commercial 
production of upgraded crude oil. “Investment” 
means the total capital invested since the 
formation of the Mixed Company until production 
of the first barrel of upgraded crude oil. 
 
b) The Ministry for Energy and Petroleum will 
grant to the Mixed Company the possibility to 
produce oil for a period of up to 36 months from the 
date of commencement of production. 
 
c) The Mixed Company will review the economy of 
the project model once completed the project basic 
enginery to produce upgraded crude oil, according 
to estimated cost Class 3, in order to quantify with 
greater definition the scheme to be selected and 
make the final decision on the investment. 
                                               
248. Id. 
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d) On the basis of the economic studies reviewed 
under previous paragraph, if the project did not 
accomplish with the timeframe for the investment 
recovery provided under paragraph a) the National 
Executive, through the Ministry of Popular Power 
for Energy and Petroleum shall grant to the Mixed 
Company, the reduction of the royalty and taxes, 
under Articles 44 and 48 of the Organic 
Hydrocarbon Law and likewise shall request to the 
other national authorities to grant other tax 
incentives that may be necessary to make the 
project financially feasible. 
 
As established in the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, these 
benefits are of temporary nature and as such will be 
applied for the period of time that the Mixed Company 
to recover the entire investment, at which time both the 
royalty and tax reduction shall be restored to original 
levels.249 
The Article imposes a duty on the Venezuelan government 
to grant 1) economic viability conditions for the investment 
recovery based upon fiscal incentives, 2) an Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) of 19%, and 3) the possibility of early production. 
First, the proposed mechanism is calculated based on economic 
studies submitted by the MC to the Ministry of Energy to seek a 
final decision about the reduction of royalties and taxes. The 
possible reduction of the royalty rate from 30% to 20% is based 
on Article 44 of the OHL, and the reduction of the tax rate from 
1/3 to 20% is based on Article 48 of the OHL. According to the 
study of Tozzini Freire and Bain & Company, “the effects of 
these two changes generate, at the most, a tax reduction 
equivalent to 10% of gross revenues.”250 This might be 
insufficient for the development of projects. Thus, the clause sets 
forth that the national executive “shall request the other 
national authorities to grant other tax incentives that may be 
necessary to make the project financially feasible,” which seems 
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250. Tozzini Freire Advogados and Bain & Company, supra note 144, at 446. 
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to be a wide fiscal promise to grant the economic feasibility of 
the project. 
The royalty and tax rate mechanism shall be revised 
annually and shall revert to their original levels when the MC 
recovers its entire investment. Thus, no provision for negotiation 
between parties has been incorporated into this scenario, as 
occurred in other adaptation or economic balancing clauses 
affecting the oil industry. In this case, the government 
maintains its discretionary power to approve these fiscal 
incentives. The clause entails, however, an obligation under 
international law since the mechanism was approved under an 
international bilateral treaty in favor of Russian investors and it 
might be also contractualized as an obligation of the Venezuelan 
government by repeating its terms in the MC contract.251 
c.  Internal Rate of Return and the Legitimate Expectation of 
the Investor 
The fiscal adjusting mechanism is based on the compromise 
to achieve an IRR equal to or greater than 19%. It sets out an 
investment recovery time frame equal to or less than seven 
years starting from the commercial production of upgraded 
crude oil that seeks to grant economic feasibility of the project. 
The relevance of the IRR is that it creates a substantive 
legitimate expectation for Russian investors and is probably a 
key element in the final determination of the investment. The 
investors’ legitimate expectations were recognized by the 
tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic as the dominant element of 
the standard of fair and equitable treatment.252 In International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, the concept of the 
investor’s legitimate expectations has been suggested as a 
“self-standing subcategory and independent basis for a claim 
under the ‘fair and equitable standard.”253 Furthermore, 
according to Parkerings-Compagniet v. Republic of Lithuania, 
                                               
251. MC Terms and Conditions between CVP and the Russian NPC G.O. No. 
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“[t]he expectation is legitimate if the investor received an 
explicit promise or guaranty from the host-State, or if implicitly, 
the host-State made assurances or representation that the 
investor took into account in making the investment. . . . In 
order to determine the legitimate expectation of an investor, it is 
also necessary to analyze the conduct of the State at the time of 
the investment.”254 
However, no legitimate expectation was created for the 
investor if he misunderstood the basis of his decision to invest or 
relied on the false assumption of his right.255 The tribunal in 
MTD Equity v. Chile concluded that the BITs are not an 
insurance against business risk and the Tribunal considers that 
the Claimants should bear the consequences of their own actions 
as experienced businessmen.256 Some questions arise on the 
enforceability of the fiscal mechanism. The provision was 
included in to the MC Terms and Conditions for the creation of a 
MC between CVP and NPC. The incorporation makes these 
obligations enforceable by either resorting to national courts or 
seeking international arbitration by invoking the protection of a 
BIT. Furthermore, another question arises about scenarios of 
price volatility that could render the 19% IRR impossible for the 
parties and the eventual applicability of force majeure or 
hardship clauses, if any. 
The model should be tested in order to determine whether it 
is progressive enough to increase the government’s take while 
overall rent grows. In designing a fiscal package, the 
government has attempted to offer a profit margin on both a 
pre-tax and post-tax basis. The question is whether this increase 
in the government’s profit share can be implemented without 
excessively burdening the investor in the risky areas or during 
lower oil price periods.257 Thus, it seems necessary to wait for 
the evolution in the implementation of this provision to reach 
further conclusions. 
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d. Early Production 
The government grants an additional incentive by 
authorizing early production for three years before the 
production of upgraded crude oil, as established by the Annex 1 
of the Russian-Venezuela Agreement on Strategic Projects. 
Article 4.b provides that “[t]he MPPEP shall grant to the Mixed 
Company the authorization to produce crude oil under the 
scheme of mixture for a period up to 36 months from the date of 
commencement of production.”258 The provision was 
incorporated in the Venezuelan National Assembly Agreement 
for the Constitution of a MC between CVP and the Russian 
NPC,259 which sets out in Article 1: “The Mixed Company shall 
sell to PDVSA Petroleo, S.A. . . . the unrefined heavy or 
extra-heavy oil it produces for a period of thirty-six months (36 
months).” 
The aim of this provision is to increase the cash flow in the 
project’s initial phase, while the upgrader is being completed 
and investments for infrastructure are needed. 
e. Two Different Tax Regimes for Primary Activities and 
Refining 
Different incentives were adopted in Annex 1 of the 
Russian-Venezuelan Agreement on Specific Projects, such as 
two types of fiscal regimes depending on the type of activity 
involved.260 
3. Business Model: The Mixed Company will develop oil 
production activities and upgrading, as well as the 
commercialization of upgraded crude oil in 
international markets as well as to PDVSA according to 
the cases i) from the upgrading process and ii) from the 
oil mixture mentioned in the preceding paragraph with 
extra-heavy crude, all of this as one integrated business 
subject to the oil taxation regime. However, to improve 
the economy of the project, the Parties may assess the 
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suitability of a disintegrated business model by forming 
a Mixed Company of production of extra heavy crude 
and a Mixed Company of refining and marketing of 
products. In the case of the Mixed Company of 
production of extra heavy crude, it is subject to the oil 
taxation regime, while the refining Mixed Company will 
be at ordinary tax rules.261 
Thus, in a government’s attempt to increase refinery 
capacity, those projects that construct refineries instead of 
upgraders will have an income tax of 34%, instead of 50%, which 
applies in the regime of extraction of crude. 
f.  Arbitration and Expropriation on the Recent BITs 
On February 29, 2009, the Venezuelan government signed a 
BIT with Vietnam in the framework of the adjudication of the 
Junín 2 Block.262 The BIT contains an arbitration clause which 
provides for ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration.263 Article 8 
Paragraph 3 sets forth the state’s consent to submit disputes 
directly arising from an investment to international 
arbitration.264 The provision also establishes a fork-in-the-road 
provision that sets forth that the selection of any of the Article 
procedures will be final. The alliance between PDVSA and 
Petrovietnam is playing a key role in the emergence of oil 
production in the Orinoco Belt in the block Junín 2. Thus, the 
government chose to give Vietnamese investors the right to 
resort to arbitration in order to attract their investment in 
Venezuela. 
Second, the Venezuela-Russia BIT contains significant 
provisions for expropriation and arbitration.265 Article 5 states 
that the compensation for expropriation must correspond ”to the 
market value of the expropriated investment.”266 This approach 
runs counter to ”the standard book value” advocated by the 
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Venezuelan government in the cases of ExxonMobil and 
ConocoPhillips.267 Further this provision also contradicts the 
recently-enacted Venezuelan law nationalizing services 
companies.268 Article 6 of the RLSC states, in reference to 
compensation for expropriations, that ”[t]o calculate the fair 
value of the above mentioned goods, at no time should lost 
profits of consequential damages be taken into account, and the 
valuation of property shall apply the criterion 
of book value deducting the labor and environmental liabilities 
determined by the competent authorities, if applicable.”269 
Moreover, Article 9 of the Russian/Venezuela BIT sets forth 
a broad scope provision to access to arbitration comprising “but 
not limited” matters of expropriation, compensation for damages 
and funds transfers.270 The Arbitration clause includes the 
possibilities of ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration and arbitration 
before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 
Institute. Undoubtedly, the friendly strategic relations between 
Venezuela and Russia have enabled the Russian negotiators to 
obtain such significant concessions. 
2. Most Favored Nation (MFN) Clause towards Orinoco Belt 
Projects 
The simultaneous implementation of licensing and direct 
negotiations has ended different arrangements for NOCs and 
IOCs to operate in the Orinoco Belt. The incentives granted in 
the Venezuela-Russia Cooperative Energy Agreement, the 
Venezuela-Russia Agreement for the Development of Specific 
Projects and the BITs Venezuela recently entered into with 
Russia and Vietnam give rise to the question of whether other 
investors might claim the same conditions based upon the MFN 
clause of their BITs. Arbitration practice has accepted that MFN 
clauses incorporate more favorable substantive investment 
protection granted to third countries.271 Likewise, arbitration 
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jurisprudence has, with one exception, declined to apply MFN 
clauses as a basis of jurisdiction for investment tribunals.272 
a. Substantive Rights 
Will the incentives granted to Russian investors such as a 
fiscal adjusting mechanism, IRR, early production and 
decision-making power be extended to other investors in projects 
in the Orinoco Belt? In an initial attempt to address this 
question, Minister Ramírez declared that participants in the 
Carabobo Project will receive similar treatment as Russian 
investors.273 Indeed, the National Assembly Agreements for the 
Incorporation of MCs in the Carabobo Project awarded Chevron 
and Repsol included provisions on fiscal adjusting mechanisms 
for royalty and tax reduction, early production of crude oil, and 
decision-making power.274 But no considerations have been 
approved comparable to the IRR terms accorded to Russian 
investors. This substantive element might be associated with 
the legitimate expectations in new projects in the Orinoco Belt 
in similar conditions. Thus, the underlying question is whether 
foreign investors could request similar treatment. 
Incentives such as royalty and extractive tax reduction will 
be granted through the adjustment mechanism, which remains 
at the Venezuelan government’s discretion. Likewise, decision 
over all tax waivers established in articles 12 and 13 of the 2011 
Windfall Profit Tax Reform, are under the control of the 
                                               
Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 2, 496, 566 (2009) [hereinafter 
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government. Thus, investors might search diligently among 
bilateral arrangements as well as special taxes or regulatory 
incentives accorded to one or more investors of another state, to 
seek the standard treatment for new oil ventures in the Orinoco 
Belt. Consequently, provisions of MFN treatment and also FET 
in BITs might play a key role in the future relations between the 
government and foreign investors which might look for equal 
treatment in “like circumstances,” compare to government’s 
concessions to NOCs from political allies in a privileged position 
to negotiate. 
However, Venezuelan BITs contain exceptions to the 
application of the MFN clause.275 The broadest and most 
common exception is the denial of preferential treatment that 
results from the host state’s membership in customs or economic 
unions, common markets and free trade areas that grant 
preferential tax treatment.276 For instance, the MFN clause in 
the BIT between France and Venezuela includes a limitation on 
tax treatment, stating that the article does not apply to tax 
matters.277 Moreover, the BIT signed between Belgium and 
Luxemburg excludes measures related to public order.278 Thus, 
in some cases the Venezuelan government could attempt to 
avoid giving incentives to third country investors on the grounds 
that the limited scope of the MFN clause excludes related tax 
measures or public order, and thereby reducing the bargaining 
position of foreign investors. 
Facing the restrictions in the scope of a MFN clause, Dr. 
Stephan W. Schill proposes a model called the “Circumvention of 
Exceptions to MFN Clauses by Double-Derivation.”279 Under 
this model, a MFN clause in the basic treaty could incorporate 
the benefits of another MFN clause in a third country BIT that 
does not contain a comparable exception to avoid the limits of 
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the scope of its own BIT.280 This broad approach to the MFN 
would enable investors to attempt to circumvent the limits of the 
MFN in the basic treaty and seek better treatment through a 
secondary MFN clause. However, this method might be rejected 
by the Venezuelan authorities because BITs contain malleable 
terms that could be interpreted to the detriment of state 
sovereignty. 281 The government might argue that a liberal 
interpretation of the BIT could extend protection to foreign 
investors beyond the initial terms that the respective state 
accepted at the onset of the BIT. 
b. Jurisdictional Rights 
Relating jurisdictional issues, arbitral tribunals have 
uniformly accepted that MFN clauses allow investors to 
circumvent restrictions on access to investor-state arbitration.282 
Specifically, they have given less favorable waiting periods if 
third country BITs offer more favorable conditions. However, 
two recent cases involving the German-Argentina BIT, Siemens 
v Argentina and Wintershall v Argentina, ruled in contradictory 
conclusions.283 The Wintershall tribunal found that MFN 
treatment did not encompass dispute settlement and it was not 
accompanied by a provision extending to all matters covered in 
the BIT. In contrast, the Siemens tribunal held that access to 
international arbitration was part of the treatment agreed to in 
the BITs and thus meant to be covered by the MFN clause. 
The recently signed Venezuelan BITs with Belarus, 
Vietnam, and Russia offer the state’s consent to international 
arbitration with a common provision to arbitrate disputes before 
ad hoc tribunals under UNCITRAL rules (and the Russian BIT 
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also before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce). Given the 
diversity of arbitration provisions, Schill asserts that 
there is no reasons why an investor should not be able 
to invoke the consent to ICSID arbitration under one of 
the host State’s third-party treaties, even though the 
basic treaty provides for arbitration under UNCITRAL 
rules, or conversely, invoke the consent to UNCITRAL 
arbitration, even though the basic treaty only provides 
for ICSID arbitration. Depending on the circumstances 
of the case, ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration may be 
more favorable for an investor in initiating investment 
treaty arbitration. While ICSID arbitration, for 
example, is more favorable than UNCITRAL 
arbitration regarding recognition and enforcement, 
UNCITRAL arbitration can be more favorable than 
ICSID arbitration as the former does not require that 
the jurisdictional requirements of Article Twenty-Five 
ICSID Convention are met, which excludes, for 
example, claims by dual nationals and may have a 
stricter scope ratione materiae as regards the notion of 
investment than some investment treaties.284 
 
Thus, the current BIT network in Venezuela sparks 
interesting questions about future relations between 
international investors and the host state. The MFN clause 
could play a key role in balancing the interests of the 
contracting parties. No single answer exists to these questions, 
and future practice and jurisprudence will provide new elements 
for their solution. Undoubtedly, the Venezuelan government’s 
view does not seem to agree with a broad approach on these 
issues, especially since the BITs practice contain explicit 
limitations on national sovereignty. However, its need for 
further investments to develop infrastructure projects and to 
increase oil production is leading the Venezuelan government to 
shift its policies in order to create the necessary conditions to 
ensure foreign investment. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates the ongoing rebalancing situation 
of the legal framework and contractual conditions of oil 
contracts in Venezuela. Specifically, it analyzes the current MC 
contractual conditions, which will be used for the development of 
the Orinoco Belt area, where one of the world’s largest reserves 
of heavy crude oil is located. 
After a decade of increasing state control, the Venezuelan 
government is seeking to guarantee foreign investment by 
exploring flexibility in the hydrocarbons fiscal regime. The 
economic incentives approved may result in an effective decision 
if some stability is granted to foreign investors. Nevertheless, 
the enactment of the Windfall Profit Tax Reform, in April 2011, 
revealed that the opportunistic behavior remains in 
government’s decisions. These decisions might cause disruptions 
on the implementation of the economic incentives and in the 
investors’ strategic to invest as planned. 
The new Venezuelan BIT network and Energy Cooperation 
Agreements are providing additional protection for NOCs and 
IOCs operating in Venezuela, which demonstrates the 
increasing reliance for protection on these treaties by oil 
companies. Further, despite the Venezuelan government’s 
hostile attitude toward international arbitration, it has been 
demonstrated that international arbitration is available to 
foreign investors through BIT protection and even through 
legitimate corporate treaty planning. 
Current negotiations in Venezuela are not a simple task. 
Investors have to adapt continuously rebalancing the interests 
of the Venezuelan government and the production companies. 
The developments are far from offering perfect solutions because 
both parties are not on an even playing field in international law 
or in the oil industry market. In fact, new agreements provide 
what could be defined as an unstable equilibrium. For instance, 
special attention should be paid to the implementation of the 
Windfall Profit Tax Reform and its consequences over the entire 
fiscal regime of hydrocarbons. Further, the implementation of 
the adjusting fiscal mechanism approved for the Junín blocks 
and the Carabobo Project would raise new questions. 
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So far, IOCs and NOCs remain interested despite tough 
contractual conditions where huge onshore reserves are located 
and geological risk is low. The agreements signed for projects in 
the Carabobo and Junín areas are close to reaching the figure of 
$80 billion for new investments in the country.285 However, 
further conditions remain to be agreed upon, and observers 
continue to be concerned about three main aspects: 1) political 
risk, 2) the performance of new players, and 3) the effectiveness 
of the new terms facing the volatility of the oil prices and the 
global economic scenarios. 
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